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Piracy of Intellectual Property in China and
the Former Soviet Union and its Effects
Upon International Trade: A Comparison
SUSAN TIEFENBRUNt
To steal a book is an elegant offense.1
No, no, it's far too obvious that the concept of intellectual property is
useless. My property must be exclusively mine.
2
INTRODUCTION
This Article is a comparison of two countries in transition,
China and Russia, and the causes and effects of the extensive
practice of intellectual property piracy. Intellectual property
piracy is committed by people and government agencies in both
countries in violation of comprehensive domestic intellectual
property laws and binding international agreements. A compari-
son is, by its very nature, a complex task. It attempts to tease
out the elements of a network of interwoven issues underlying a
crime committed in two different countries with similar political
ideologies. The causes and effects of intellectual property piracy
t This Article was presented at a symposium entitled 'On The Threshold of The
Asian Century. Financial Markets and Services in The Asia Pacific Region" sponsored by
Hofstra University at the Frank G. Zarb School of Business for the Merrill Lynch Center
for the Study of International Financial Services and Markets on April 11, 1997. I wish
to give special thanks for the research assistance of Jeremy Wolk, Hofstra University
School of Law, without whose precision and interest in the subject this study could not
have been accomplished. I also wish to thank Professor Peter Krug of Oklahoma Univer-
sity School of Law who read and commented on earlier drafts of this study and who pro-
vided invaluable assistance on the section devoted to Russia.
1. Chinese Proverb.
2. Christian Sigmund Krause (1783).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
are intricately connected to, and affected by, the economy of the
country in which the piracy is committed, the political history
and ideology of the pirating nation, the culture of the people en-
gaged in the piracy, and the adequacy of the legal system to en-
force its intellectual property laws. This Article attempts to take
these complex factors into consideration in the comparison.
This Article is organized into four parts. This Introduction
examines the contradictions inherent in intellectual property
legislation, counterbalanced by the negative effects of U.S. ef-
forts to combat intellectual property piracy in the global trade
market. China and Russia ineffectively enforce newly enacted
intellectual property legislation and anti-piracy laws, which re-
sult in sizable revenue losses for the United States. Attempting
to trace the causes of piracy, this Introduction examines in more
detail the current economies of China and Russia and compares
their contrasting approaches to transition from a planned to a
market economy.
Part I examines the history and development of China's do-
mestic intellectual property legislation covering trademarks,
patents and copyrights and its compliance with international in-
tellectual property conventions; the causes and effects of viola-
tions of intellectual property legislation; the laws affecting trade
secrets; the trade agreements affecting legislation; the extent of
piracy in China; and the Chinese and U.S. attempts to combat
piracy and the effect of these efforts on international trade.
Part II examines Russia: the influence of its political ideol-
ogy on the history and development of domestic intellectual
property legislation covering trademarks, patents, and copy-
rights and Russian compliance with international intellectual
property conventions; the role of trade agreements in the devel-
opment of new intellectual property legislation; the extent of
piracy of intellectual property in Russia; Russian and U.S. at-
tempts to combat piracy and the effects of these efforts on inter-
national trade. Part IM outlines possible solutions to the piracy
of intellectual property.
A. Intellectual Property Law
Intellectual property law is a conundrum. In theory, intel-
lectual property law grants a limited legal monopoly to individu-
als as a reward for originality, as an incentive to create, and as
a protection against piracy. In practice, the legal monopoly is
granted less often to the starving artist who justifiably seeks re-
muneration for his creative endeavors, but rather to a limited
number of large corporations and employers for creations that
[Vol. 46
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are often transformative of original thinking and already located
in the public domain.3 The system of intellectual property is
both rights-oriented and utilitarian, relying on antithetical con-
cepts of public and private domain.4 The paradox in intellectual
property law becomes clear when one considers copyright protec-
tion. Private property copyright law enforces the owner's right
to exclude others from copying the original expression of the
owner's idea.5 On the one hand, copyright provides incentives to
authors and encourages the production of more ideas and infor-
mation for increased public consumption. On the other hand,
copyright provides a metaphoric "fence" which keeps the public
out of the private property of the author.6 Intellectual property
law is caught up in the complex contradiction of conferring pri-
vate property rights to a limited number of individuals and cor-
porations7 while limiting the free flow of information and re-
stricting its access and transmission in what seems to be an
economically inefficient system.8
B. Violations of Intellectual Property Laws in China and Russia
China and Russia have transformed their old and anti-
quated intellectual property laws. These laws were based in so-
cialist ideology, which is fundamentally incompatible with the
principle of property ownership. Despite these laws which are
designed to protect the rights of trademark, patent, and copy-
right owners, many people, as well as government agencies in
both countries, are currently engaging in the piracy of intellec-
tual property and detrimentally affecting international trade.
Both countries have attempted to enact anti-piracy laws,
and both have failed terribly to enforce these laws. Piracy of in-
tellectual property has resulted in lost revenues for the United
States of billions of dollars each year and has affected the abil-
ity of the United States to trade effectively with these pirating
countries. Total losses to the United States' economy due to in-
tellectual property piracy continue to range from $20 billion to
3. See JAMEs BoYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTwARE AND SpLENs (1996) (offering a full-blown
attack on the justification of intellectual property laws).
4. See id. at 52.
5. Keith Aoki, Intellectual Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geog-
raphy of Authorship, 48 STAN. L REv. 1293, 1336 (1996).
6. See BoYLE, supra note 3, at 19.
7. See id. at Preface XIII (the language of romantic authorship ... is used to sup-
port sweeping intellectual property rights for large corporate entities: Sony, Pfizer,





The United States has attempted various approaches to
combat piracy of intellectual property in Russia and China. It
has proposed and imposed unilateral sanctions against the For-
mer Soviet Union and against China for unfair trade practices
under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.10 Section 301
reaches beyond the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,"
as well as the World Trade Organization (WTO), to give the
President of the United States unilateral power to penalize
countries that threaten American economic interests. The
United States has proposed and imposed Super 301 proceedings
against China for violating intellectual property rights resulting
in a 1995 announcement of sanctions of one hundred percent on
$1.08 billion of Chinese imports.'2 Super 30113 amended Section
301 of the Trade Act of 1974 in the Omnibus Trade and Com-
petitiveness Act of 1988.14 Super 301 requires the United States
Trade Representative (USTR) and its administration to provide
an annual list of foreigners' "unfair" trade practices ("priority
practices") that could result in sanctions.'5 Special 301,16 a sub-
set of Super 301, requires the USTR to provide an annual "pri-
ority list," as well as a "watch list," of foreigners engaging in in-
fringement of intellectual property. The United States has also
sought protection against foreign infringers of intellectual prop-
erty by enacting Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930.17 Section
337 allows holders of U.S. intellectual property rights to obtain
expedited relief from the United States International Trade
Commission against imports which infringe upon these rights.
The United States has also threatened non-renewal of China's
Most-Favored-Nation status in order to control its piracy of in-
9. See id. at 121.
10. Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 US.C. §§ 2411-2420 (1994) [hereinafter
Section 301]. See also infra text accompanying notes 267-74.
11. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, TI.A.S.
No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATI.
12. Martha M. Hamilton, US. to Hit China with Stiff Tariffs, WASI PoST, Feb. 5,
1995, at Al.
13. Super 301 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 19 U.S.C.
§ 2420 (A)(1)(a)-(b) (1994) [hereinafter Super 301]. See also infra text accompanying
notes 275-282.
14. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat.
1107 [hereinafter Trade Act of 1988].
15. See id.
16. Special 301 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 19 U.S.C.
§ 2242(a)(1XA) [hereinafter Special 301]. See also infra text accompanying notes 275-82.
17. 19 US.C. § 337 (1930) [hereinafter Section 337]. See also infra text accompany-
ing notes 283-86.
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tellectual property. The United States continues to refuse to ad-
mit China into the WTO, which has its own Dispute Resolution
Mechanism to combat trade distortion practices. Despite these
multifaceted attempts to combat piracy of intellectual property,
piracy continues to prevail in China and Russia.
C. Economics of China and Russia, and Strategies of
Transition
Although both China and Russia were communist countries
firmly rooted in a traditional Marxist/Leninist ideology, the
present difference between Chinese and Russian economic per-
formance is quite remarkable. 18 Since 1979, under the leader-
ship of Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese have gradually and sequen-
tially adopted market reform tactics resulting in a currently
booming economy.19 In contrast, Russia's similar reform move-
ments initiated by Gorbachev during the era of Perestroika and
Glasnost produced a revolution in 1991 resulting in the collapse
of communism, the establishment of a fragmented Common-
wealth of Independent States, and the radical adoption of mar-
ket reforms and privatization that have resulted in the economic
decline and demoralization of the Russian peoples.
China's transition strategy has been distinctively Asian, as
it follows a model of development similar to South Korea and
other neighboring Asian countries like Taiwan, Hong Kong and
Singapore.2 0 Following the example of New Industrializing Econ-
omies (NIEs), the Chinese gave farms back to the farmers, gen-
erating huge increases in productivity, income, and output, with
little state investment.21 By encouraging the growth of rural en-
terprises and not focusing exclusively on the urban sector,
China successfully moved workers off farms into factories.
22
China's open door policy encouraged foreign investments, which
created more jobs, produced gains in outputs and exports at
negligible cost to the government, and linked the Chinese econ-
omy to the international market.2 3 China also gave priority to
light and medium industry, yielding a surge of output with lim-
18. WH.JAl HR OVERHOLT, THE RISE OF CHNA: How ECONOMIC REFORM IS CREATING
A NEw SUPERPOWER 32 (1993).
19. Seth Faison, Asia's Giant, After Detours, Takes Familiar Growth Path, N.Y.
Tn Es, Mar. 4, 1997, at D1.
20. OVERHOLT, supra note 18, at 32.
21. See id. at 33.





ited initial investment.2 ' Like Taiwan and Hong Kong, in the
1960s and 1970s China flooded the world market with textiles,
garments, shoes, toys, and consumer electronics. China became
a global force in these commodities by the 1980s and 1990s
which caused an explosion of growth, consumer goods produc-
tion, personal income, exports, and foreign exchange earnings.2
In contrast, the Soviet Union neglected agriculture, was less
encouraging to foreign investment, developed its heavy industry,
and was too quick to liberalize its prices which caused panic and
hyperinflation.2 The Soviet government, in imitation of the Chi-
nese who began joint ventures in 1979, enacted joint venture
laws which progressively permitted more control by foreign part-
ners.27 Like the Chinese, the post-Soviet government eventually
permitted wholly-foreign-owned ventures.28 The Russians even
passed land reform laws29 permitting the ownership of land by
foreigners, but practical problems caused by the failure to en-
force these laws and the intricacies of bureaucracy discouraged
land ownership.30 The Russians emphasized massive equipment
imports, built more machines, used more and more machine
tools, organized industry under superministries and attempted
to improve the petroleum industry and reorganize the automo-
bile and high-technology sectors.31 These efforts required high
initial and continued capital expenditures. The result of the So-
viet strategy was the collapse of production coupled with crip-
pling inflation. Moreover, unlike China which privatized slowly,
the Soviets and post-Soviets placed a premature emphasis on
privatization of state enterprises which was unsuccessfully im-
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. OVERHOLT, supra note 18, at 32.
27. Susan W. Tiefenbrun, Joint Ventures in the U.S.S.R., Eastern Europe, and the
People's Republic of China as of December 1989, 21 N.Y.U. J. INTL L & PoL. 667, 679
(1989).
28. OVERHOLT, supra note 18, at 166.
29. William G. Frenkel, Private Land Ownership in Russia: An Overview of Legal
Developments to Date, 3 PAKER SCIL JE. EUR. L. 257 (1996). Progress has been achieved
in the area of residential land ownership by individuals in Russia, but little progress has
been made in land privatization in post-Soviet Russia with respect to agricultural and
urban land. Privatization of agrarian land has met with strong resistance and resulted
in a legal vacuum for the conveyance of farmland and its use. Id.
30. Olga Floroff & Susan W. Tiefenbrun, Land Ownership in the Russian Federa-
tion: Laws and Obstacles, 37 ST. Louis U. LJ. 235 (1993). See also Olga Floroff & Susan
W. Tiefenbrun, New Soviet Fundamentals of Law on Land Ownership, 4 N.Y. IWr'L L.
REv. 93 (1991).
31. OVE HOLT, supra note 18, at 33.
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plemented by a law adopted in June, 1992.32 Although equally
unsuccessful, Russia revised its privatization program in 1994,
in hopes that a new privatization program might prove to be
more successful than the firstu3 As a result of all these radical
unsuccessful measures, a depression resulted in Russia caused
by a lack of supply rather than inadequate demand.3 Russia's
economy today is half the size of the Soviet Union's in its final
days.35 Russia has suffered five straight years of economic de-
cline. Even though many experts predict that Russia may expe-
rience real growth in 1998, an economic boom is unlikely.36
Unlike the radical approach of the Soviets, Deng Xiaoping
believed in reform as a sequencing process, slow and balanced.
His strategy involved a gradual exploitation of international
markets, the taming of multinational corporations, the educa-
tion of the Chinese people, the serving of Western markets, and
the creation of competitive organizations. Deng Xiaoping focused
on human resources rather than on natural resource cartels,
which was the strategy of the New International Economic Or-
der of Third World countries.37
Gorbachev's strategy was more radical, and he effectuated
changes all at once which ultimately produced failure.38 The So-
viet Union, the CIS and Eastern Europe engaged in spasmodic
approaches to reform-Poland's "Big Bang," Russia's "Shock
Therapy," Shatalin's bold economic plan to privatize the Soviet
Union in five hundred days, to convert the ruble, and to decon-
trol prices (which were never actually implemented). The Soviet
people resented this assault on their lifestyle and this disman-
tling of a formerly protective welfare system. In contrast, China
remained cautious about privatization and held to the belief
that price reform must be in place before privatization could be
instituted.3 9 China chose to delay privatization until it had liber-
32. See Kaj Hob~r, The 1994 Privatization Program: Has Russian Privatization
Reached the Age of Aquarius?, SZEZE, Apr. 1994, at 1 (citing President Yeltsin's Decree
No. 2284 of Dec. 24, 1993 which provides for a new privatization program for Russia.
The first privatization program was adopted on June 11, 1992. Russian privatization leg-
islation is detailed, complex, and composed of a myriad of laws, decrees and regulations).
33. See Olga Floroff & Susan Tiefenbrun, A Legal Framework for Soviet Privatiza-
tion, 18 PEPP. L REv. 849 (1991).
34. OVERHOLT, supra note 18, at 35.
35. Sherman Garnett, Russia's Illusory Ambitions, FOREIGN AFF. Mar.-Apr. 1997, at
61-62.
36. See id. at 62.
37. OVERHOLT, supra note 18, at 34.
38. See id. at 36.
39. See id. at 43.
1998]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
alized prices, created a national pension system, provided alter-
native medical and education programs, undertaken major
banking reforms, and set up stock markets.40
Deng Xiaoping had the communists and the majority of the
military leadership on his side in favor of economic reform.' 1 Al-
though the Communist Party Politburo and the Central Com-
mittee often approved Gorbachev's actions, Gorbachev quickly
lost the support of farmers, workers, the managerial class, the
military, and the Communist Party leadership, all of whom had
good reason to despise the consequences of his reforms.42 Com-
pounding Soviet economic and military decline are the political
confusion and fragmentation which caused the government's dis-
integration. 3 Ironically, the main beneficiaries of the Soviet and
post-Soviet economic reforms were the intellectuals who coveted
freedom of speech, and the foreigners who reveled in the politi-
cal victory of democracy over communism.
As a result of the economic breakdown and political frag-
mentation caused by the Soviet economic reforms of the 1990s,
Russia was unable to pay its foreign debts. In contrast, China
remained economically solid, unfettered by ethnic diversity.
China is an ancient nation, not a new creation like the former
Soviet Union. China's population is ninety-four percent Han
Chinese, whereas the USSR's was less than half Russian. China
avoided fragmentation and general political and economic crisis
by severely cutting its military budgets and avoiding sabotage
from within the Communist Party, which occurred in Poland,
post-Soviet Russia and the CIS." But it is important to recog-
nize that despite the economic and social problems which exist
in Russia and Eastern Europe as a result of the reforms, the
economy in Poland is better today than it was under the com-
munist regime, and Hungary and the Czech Republic are show-
ing dramatic economic improvements since the collapse of
communism.
Although the Chinese transition strategy appears to work
better than Russia's or Poland's, there are problems in China
which should be noted. While private companies are forming in
China, much of the power to obtain housing, raw materials,
credit, and employment is still within the control of the state
40. See id. at 44.
41. See id. at 37-38.
42. See id. at 39.
43. Garett, supra note 35, at 64.
44. OVERHOLT, supra note 18, at 59.
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and Communist Party bureaucrats. 45 Published and unpub-
lished regulations and licenses required by the state slow down
the process of corporate formation. Corruption exists, and gov-
ernment officials make better salaries than most individuals.4
Another clash between economic progress in China and the
reality of underlying problems is in the area of the law. Foreign
investors believe in contract law, and the desire to do large-scale
business with foreigners has forced China to create a legal sys-
tem that is not arbitrary or based on state policy but governed
by the rule of law.47 Reform and openness to the outside world
have precipitated calls for renovation of Chinese legal statutes
including their intellectual property laws. 48 Legal reform is just
beginning in China, and the rule of law is still largely confined
to commercial contracts.
China is a repressive country with widespread abuses of ba-
sic human rights. Even though the massacre at Tiananmen
Square in June 1989 is long gone, the persistence of human
rights abuses in China today is one of the determining factors in
the continued refusal of the United States to admit China into
the World Trade Organization.
Despite the marked differences in the current economic con-
ditions of China and Russia, both countries are similarly engag-
ing in shocking abuses of their own domestic intellectual prop-
erty laws. Both countries are violating international intellectual
property agreements recently adopted in response to pressure
from the Western world, which is reflected in US-USSR and US-
China trade agreements. 49 In both China and Russia, where
views on ownership of property similarly reflect the common so-
cialist ideological background, the government, government in-
stitutions, and many individuals allegedly engage in pirating.
Government violations of domestic and international intellectual
property law make it all the more difficult to discourage this il-
legal practice by corporations and individuals.
45. See id. at 79.
46. See id. at 80-81.
47. See id. at 143.
48. Chih-Yu Shili, China's Socialist Law Under Reform: The Class Nature Reconsid-
ered, 44 AM. J. CoMP. L. 627 (1996).
49. US.-China Intellectual Property Accord, 1995: Hearings on US.-Sino Intellectual
Property Rights Agreement before the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (statement of




A. The History and Development of Chinese Domestic
Intellectual Property Laws and China's Compliance with
International Intellectual Property Conventions
Chinese intellectual property laws protecting trademarks,
patents, and copyrights actually predate the Soviet-inspired
laws.50 Throughout imperial Chinese history" there were no
counterparts to contemporary ideas of intellectual property
law. 52 Chinese writers, artists,, and creators in all areas of
knowledge had significant reverence and attachment for the
past which resulted in legitimized copying.53 In the eighteenth
century under the Qianlong dynasty, the Emperor maintained
indifference to foreign objects, manufactures and ideas.54 This
negative attitude toward innovation soon changed, and China
passed formal legal measures to systematically protect "inge-
nious" objects.55 As foreign economic involvement in China con-
tinued and expanded in the late nineteenth century, complaints
of the unauthorized use of foreign trade names and trademarks
began to arise.56 By the turn of the century intellectual property
problems increased in China, and foreign merchants, expecting
that the integrity of their trademarks duly registered at home
would be protected in China, were disappointed in China.5 7 But
these foreign merchants failed to take action against China's
non-compliance with international standards set forth in the
Paris Convention in 1883 and the Berne Convention in 1886 to
which China was not yet a signatory.58 Foreign merchants did
not try to redress their grievances concerning the Chinese in-
fringement of trademarks, but instead concentrated on the
promise of a market of "four hundred million customers."5 9
Chinese intellectual property laws were adopted at various
stages before and after the establishment of the People's Repub-
lic of China in 1949. The development of laws regulating crea-
50. See generally W .amm P. ALFORD, To STEAL A BOOK Is AN ELEGANT OMNSE
(1995) (offering a detailed account of the history of Chinese intellectual property laws).
51. See id.
52. See id. at 19.
53. See id. at 29.
54. See id. at 30.
55. See id.
56. See id. at 34.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See id. at 35.
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tive and inventive endeavor was an integral part of an effort in
the early part of the twentieth century to foster a new legal sys-
tem in China.60 For example, the first intellectual property law
was passed in 1928, a copyright law which is no longer in ef-
fect.61 Urbane lawyers who prepared China's modern republican
code in the 1930s created laws including the Copyright Law of
1928, which were profoundly at odds with the central govern-
ment's mission to control the flow of ideas and were, thus, gen-
erally not enforced.62
With the establishment of the Chinese People's Republic
(PRC) on October 1, 1949, the Chinese Communist Party invali-
dated the entire corpus of republican law and began to articu-
late a new legal system modeled after the USSR. The Soviet
model reflected traditional Chinese attitudes toward intellectual
property and expounded the socialist belief that by inventing or
creating, individuals were engaging in social activities based on
knowledge that belonged to all members of society."4 The early
efforts at regulating intellectual property rights in the PRC are
limited to laws regulating only patents and trademarks. Patent
law of the early PRC is reflected in the Provisional Regulations
on the Protection of Invention Rights and Patent Rights of Au-
gust 11, 195065 which followed the Soviet two-track system by
granting a state certificate of invention to select inventors on
the preferred track. With respect to trademarks, in 1950 the
Chinese government promulgated Procedures for Dealing with
Trademarks Registered at the Trademark Office of the Former
Guomindang Government and the Provisional Regulations on
Trademark Registration.6 6 Relatively few holders of marks
sought to avail themselves of the opportunity to register their
marks because registration was not required, intellectual prop-
erty law remained unfamiliar, and people feared political conse-
quences of asserting such property interests.67 No comparable
provisional regulations were promulgated with respect to copy-
right during the early years of the PRC.0 In imitation of the So-
viet system, the Chinese government asserted control over the
content of what was published. Authors were entitled to fixed
60. See id. at 50.
61. See id.
62. See id. at 54.
63. See id. at 56.
64. See id. at 57.
65. See id.





"basic payments" for their work and had the right to prevent
unauthorized alteration of their work.6 9 Enjoyment of this right
was dependent on approval by the state which controlled all au-
thorized publishing outlets.
Both the Anti-Rightist Movement of 1957 and the Great
Leap Forward of 1958-1960 raised serious doubts about provid-
ing material incentives for people engaged in inventive, creative,
and commercial activity.70 China's intellectual property laws of
the 1950s were amended during this repressive period to reduce
property rights.71 The Chinese government enacted regulations
which removed patent protection from the law and specified that
inventions and improvements in technology were to be the ex-
clusive property of the state.72 This rights-based retrenchment
was not limited to inventive activity, and new regulations on
trademark registration were enacted without any mention of
rights of exclusive use. This simply required that all trademarks
be registered, that the quality of the products be stated, and
that the quality control over products be regulated by a General
Administration of Commerce which had the power to cancel
trademark registrations for substandard products. 73 Although
there were no comprehensive provisional copyright regulations
in China, remuneration to authors formerly based on the num-
ber of books printed or reprinted was henceforth eliminated, in
keeping with the move to curtail rights.74 Limited remuneration
to authors was now based on quality rather than quantity.
In the period called the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolu-
tion which began in 1966, further restrictions on intellectual
property were implemented. Theaters were banned, all activities
of scientists, writers and other intellectuals were disrupted, and
many so-called dissident creators of art and science were impris-
oned.75 In this repressive environment, intellectual property
laws were also revised. The state ceased to provide the already
reduced remuneration for inventors, and individuals engaging in
creative endeavors were too fearful to acknowledge their per-
sonal role in inventive activity.7 6 As for copyright, those authors
whose works were deemed worthy of publication were unable to
69. See id. at 61.
70. See id. at 61.
71. See id. at 62.
72. See id.
73. See id. at 63.
74. See id.
75. See id. at 64.
76. See id. The compulsory trademark registrations system established in 1963 was
halted.
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secure protection. The state itself freely reproduced or tolerated
the reproduction of such works without permission of the author
or original publisher, without providing any remuneration, and
in some instances even without acknowledging authorship.
77
Therein lies one source of the practice of intellectual property
piracy in China today.
By 1975, Deng Xiaoping and other leaders were concerned
about China's slow development, and they requested a program
of modernization. The Cultural Revolution officially ended in
1976. By 1977, modernization efforts played a central policy role
under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping.78 He sought to restore
the intellectual property laws that were in place before the Cul-
tural Revolution began. Thus, the Chinese government reissued
the 1963 regulations covering patents and providing monetary
rewards for inventors. 79 During this period leaders made similar
efforts to return trademark laws to the status quo. China recon-
stituted the State General Administration for Industry and
Commerce (SGAIC), the China Council for the Promotion of In-
ternational Trade (CCPIT), and the 1963 Trademark Regula-
tions requiring registrations of marks.80 With respect to copy-
right, in 1977 the government issued the State Administration
of Publication of the Trial Circular Concerning Basic and Sup-
plemental Payments for News Publications which returned re-
muneration to authors at the same level of compensation that
they were entitled to before the Cultural Revolution.81 Later
payments to authors will be granted at a level consistent with
those made prior to the Great Leap Forward.8 2
With these legal measures now in place, the United States
and the PRC were able to conclude a trade agreement in 1979,83
which prompted the further revision of intellectual property leg-
islation. Generally, the Chinese, wishing to receive foreign tech-
nology and other international economic benefits, were in favor
of developing a new patent system. The United States continued
77. See id. at 64-65.
78. See id. at 65.
79. See id. See also infra text accompanying notes 114-36 (discussing in detail
China's patent laws).
80. See ALFoRD, supra note 50. See also infra text accompanying notes 90-113 (dis-
cussing in detail Chinas trademark laws).
8L See ALFORD, supra note 50, at 66. See also infra text accompanying notes 137-84
(discussing in detail China's copyright laws).
82. See ALFORD, supra note 50, at 66.
83. Agreement on Trade Relations Between the United States of America and the
People's Republic of China, July 7, 1979, U.S.-P.R.C., 31 U.S.T. 4652 [hereinafter The
1979 Trade Agreement]. See infra text accompanying notes 185-94.
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to be concerned about the piracy of its intellectual property.
Ironically, leading Chinese publications were suggesting that
the failure to obtain patent protection abroad for Chinese inven-
tions had resulted in the appropriation of Chinese inventions by
foreigners." But others in China opposed the adoption of a pat-
ent system, for it was deemed incompatible with socialist ideol-
ogy and inherently corrupting. Despite the conflict among the
Chinese leaders, Deng Xiaoping determined that China should
adopt a new patent law. The Patent Law was ultimately passed
on March 12, 1984, after more than five years of drafts and
redrafts reflecting the internal conflict.8
Protective intellectual property laws were passed in the
1980s as a result of the 1979 Trade Agreement entered into by
the United States and the PRC, but intellectual property piracy
continued well into the 1990s. Two more trade agreements be-
tween the United States and the PRC were signed in 1992 and
1995 and resulted in more protective intellectual property
laws. 7 Currently, protection for intellectual property in China is
not provided solely by the trademark, copyright, and patent
laws. For instance, some forms of unfair competition, such as
passing-off, are prohibited. 8 Additional protection for intellec-
tual property is also provided on the basis of contract law, the
Law on Foreign Economic Contracts, and the Regulations on the
Administration of Technology Import Contracts. 9
B. Chinese Trademark Laws
Among the three areas of intellectual property law, China
accorded legal protection to trademarks first. In 1904, China is-
sued the Trial Regulations for Trademark Registration.90 The
law lapsed because it placed the interests of foreigners second to
nationals. The Trademark Law of 1923 and the Trademark Law
of 1931, which revised the 1904 Trial Regulations for
84. ALFORD, supra note 50, at 68.
85. See id.
86. See id. at 69.
87. See infra text accompanying notes 196-225.
88. ARTHUR WmEBURG, INTELLECTUAL PROPErTY PROTECTION IN ASIA § 3.02 n.5 (1994)
(citing Trade Mark Law, Art. 40 (1982 Chinese Trademark Law) and Trade Mark Regu-
lations Rule 45 (1983 Chinese Trademark Regulations)).
89. See id.
90. Jesse TH Chang & Charles J. Conroy, Trademark Law in the People's Republic
of China, in FOREIGN TRADE, INVESrMENT AND THE LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CEIINA 267 (Michael J. Moser ed., 1984).
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Trademark Registration, offered little change.91
China issued the Provisional Regulations Governing Trade-
mark Registration in 195092 which were replaced in 1963 by
Regulations Governing the Control of Trademarks.93 From 1963
on, foreigners were permitted to register their marks in China.94
China promulgated a comprehensive trademark law in 1982,
with accompanying implementing regulations a year later. These
regulations were abandoned in 1988, and Detailed Rules for the
Implementation of Trademark Law were enacted again. China
joined the Madrid Agreement for International Registration of
Trademarks in July 1989.15
The 1982 Chinese Trademark Law offers protection "for the
exclusive right to use a trademark," but these rights are created
only in so far as they foster the development of the socialist
market economy.9 6 As with patent, trademark rights and reme-
dies are more restricted than the laws seem to indicate. The
1982 Chinese Trademark Law denies protection to service
marks, 97 collective marks, certification marks, and defensive
marks as well as to trademarks falling into such unusual cate-
gories as "being detrimental to socialist morality or customs or
having other undesirable influences," or "being ethnically dis-
criminatory."18 Marks have to be filed on a "per mark, per class"
basis rather than on a multiclass basis thereby making it more
difficult and expensive for individuals to secure protection in
multiple classes. This requirement increases the possibility that
persons acting in bad faith will register marks generated by
others.99 The per mark, per class requirement constitutes a po-
tential source of trademark piracy generated by the failure of
the law as written. Moreover, the trademark law's rigid adher-
ence to a first-to-file rule and its limited procedures for opposing
or seeking the cancellation of registrations made in bad faith
91. See id.
92. See id. at 267-68.
93. See id.
94. See id. at 269.
95. It is interesting to note that the Hong Kong government published a draft Trade
Marks Bill on February 5, 1997 to replace its current Trade Marks Ordinance in light of
the transfer of sovereignty over Hong Kong from the United Kingdom to China on July
1, 1997. Consultation Paper on Hong Kong: New Trade Marks law, 11 World Intell. Prop.
Rep. (BNA) 77, at 104 (Mar. 1997).
96. ALFoRD, supra note 50, at 75.
97. See infra text accompanying note 102 (discussing the 1993 amendment to the
1982 Trademark Law which makes service marks registrable).
98. ALFoRD, supra note 50, at 75.
99. See id. at 76.
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also exacerbate the problem of piracy.100
The 1982 Chinese Trademark Law, as well as the 1984 Chi-
nese Patent Law, follow the principle of first to file.101 The 1982
Chinese Trademark Law is silent as to whether a mark may ac-
quire distinctiveness through use in trade. 0 2 Under the 1982
Trademark Law, as amended in 1993, service marks are regis-
trable, and provisions of the law concerning trademarks for
goods apply to service marks.103 "An important element of the
1982 [Chinese Trademark Law] is its emphasis on quality con-
trol and consumer protection."1 0 4 Therefore, registration for
marks on pharmaceuticals and tobacco is mandatory. Absent
such registration the administrative authorities will not permit
these goods to be sold or may impose fines.10 5
"Certain foreign applicants are permitted to file for and ob-
tain trademark registrations in the [People's Republic of China]
on the basis of a bilateral agreement between the PRC and the
foreign applicant's home country, international conventions to
which the PRC and the foreign applicant's home country are
members, or reciprocity."10 6 A United States applicant has a
right to apply for and obtain trademark registration in the PRC
under Article 9 of the 1979 Bilateral Trade Agreement. The
trademark application and all accompanying documents must be
in Chinese (or if in English accompanied by a notarized Chinese
translation), and the application must be accompanied by ten
copies of the proposed trademark.10 7 A certificate of registration
is in force for ten years from the date of approval, and a ten-
year renewal term is available. 08
The enforcement of trademark rights is the responsibility of
the trademark owner who may send a cease-and-desist letter,
and some assistance may be obtained from the CCPIT Patent &
Trademark Law Office or other law firms.10 9 "These agencies are
empowered to issue cease-and-desist-order-like protection for
100. See id.
101. WINEBURG, supra note 88, at § 3.02 n.8 (citing Article 9 of the 1984 Chinese
Patent Law).
102. See id. § 3.12.
103. See id. § 3.12 (D).
104. Id. § 312 (E).
105. See id. § 3.12 nn.75-76 (citing Rule 7 and Arts. 5, 33 of the 1982 Trademark
Law).
106. Id. § 3.13.
107. See id. § 3.15 (citing Rule 9 of the 1982 Chinese Trademark Law).
108. See id. § 3.19 (citing Arts. 23'and 24 of the 1982 Chinese Trademark Law).
109. Id. at § 3.24 (citing Art. 39 and Rules 42, 43).
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infringement and to order the payment of compensation n" 1 0 The
collection of damages is based on illegal profit obtained by the
infringer during the infringing period or the loss suffered by the
owners caused by the acts of infringement."'
Alternative relief may be obtained through formal or informal mediation
by the CCPIT's arbitration commission. Finally, a civil suit may be
brought directly in the [Chinese People's Court], or by way of appeal
from an administrative decision. A civil suit may take anywhere from six
months to two years to conclude.112
Remedies are problematic in the 1982 Chinese Trademark Law
because of the emphasis on the administrative resolution of in-
fringement and the failure to articulate procedures for the reso-
lution of infringement problems.
113
C. Chinese Patent Laws
Provisional Rules of the Encouragement of Arts and Crafts,
the first Chinese law in the area of patents, was issued in 1911
and revised in 1923.114 This law provides that new inventions
are protectable for five years and patents are issued to Chinese
nationals exclusively. Foreigners can protect patent interests
only if there is a treaty to which China is a party.
China issued the Provisional Regulations Concerning the
Protection of the Invention Right and the Patent Right in 1950.
At this time, inventions in China were considered state property
in imitation of Soviet patent law and in accordance with Marx-
ist theory."5 In 1954, Provisional Regulations on Awards for In-
ventors, Technical Improvements and Rationalization Proposals
Relating to Production were added."n Patents were given to en-
terprises and could be made available to others if they were not
worked within three years after being granted. Amended in
110. See id.
11L See id. § 3.24.
112. See id.
113. ALFoRD, supra note 50, at 76.
114. See ZHENG CHENGS!, CHINESE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TEcHNoLoGY TRANs-
FER LAw 51 (1987) (analyzing the patent laws in China). See generally Ross J. Oehler,
Note, Patent Law in the People's Republic of China: A Primer, 8 N.YL. SCH. J. INT'L &
Comp. L. 451 (1987) (offering further background information).
115. See CHENGSI, supra note 114, at 53 (distinguishing between Soviet and Chinese
patent protection by explaining that a foreign enterprise using a Soviet invention owed
royalties to the state, while in China, a foreign transfer divested both the inventor and
the state from exclusive rights to the invention).
116. L. Mark Wu-Ohlson, A Commentary on China's New Patent and Trademark
Laws, 6 Nw. J. INT'L L & Bus. 86, 89 (1984).
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1978, these regulations were finally replaced by a cohesive pat-
ent law system in 1984. n1 In 1980, a Patent Bureau was estab-
lished in China.
The Memorandum of Understanding concerning the protec-
tion of intellectual property (1992 MOU)118 was signed on Janu-
ary 17, 1992, just after a Super 301 investigation was initiated in
1991 and ultimately halted in December 1991. The 1992 MOU
extended patent protection to chemical (pharmaceutical and ag-
ricultural) inventions for a term of twenty years from the date
of application. Compulsory licensing was diluted. China agreed
to enact the relevant law by January 1993. China joined the
Patent Cooperation Treaty in 1992.
The 1984 Chinese Patent Law and the Implementing Regu-
lations of the Patent Law constitute the current regime of pat-
ent protection in the PRC. The 1984 Chinese Patent Law pro-
vides for the granting of "patent rights" to persons or entities
with "invention-creations" meeting the requisite standards of
novelty, inventiveness, and practicality. The 1984 law reflects an
uneasiness in China about adopting the concept of legitimate
ownership of any form of private property.'19 For example, the
1984 Chinese Patent Law makes it difficult for individuals to se-
cure rights which might provide them with a monopoly, but it
does promise individuals material rewards in order to spur on
invention.120 Moreover, the 1984 Chinese Patent Law moves
away from invention patents with a fifteen-year term toward a
utility model which offers lesser rights and only a five-year
term.121 The 1984 Chinese Patent Law also limits rights and
grants instead monetary rewards for inventions. 22 As further
examples of its limits on rights, the 1984 Chinese Patent Law
provides for compulsory licensing. It also fails to provide the
Chinese with the same priority rights granted to foreigners who
filed patent applications abroad and are thereby granted a
twelve-month priority period to file in China.1m
As with trademarks, the 1984 Chinese Patent Law follows a
first-to-file system. 124 Therefore, the first to file the patent
117. CEENGSI, supra note 114, at 53-56.
118. OFFICE OF THE UNTrED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 1992 NATIONAL TRADE RE-
PORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 48 (1992) [hereinafter 1992 NATIONAL TRADE ESTI.
MATE]. See infra text accompanying notes 195-198 for a discussion of the 1992 MOU
119. Alford, supra note 50, at 70.
120. See id.
121. See id.
122. See id. at 70-71.
123. See id. at 71.
124. WINEBURG, supra note 88, § 3.02 n.8 (citing Art. 9 of the 1984 Chinese Patent
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rather than the first to invent the subject invention is the owner
of the patent. Patent protection is available for only certain sub-
ject matter, and nine categories of subject matter are not pat-
entable (for example, scientific discoveries or rules and methods
for mental activities).2 5 An invention or utility model that is
patentable must also show novelty, inventiveness and utility,
whereas a design must show only novelty to be patented.
26
The right to apply for a patent in the PRC generally be-
longs to the inventor-creator. "[HMowever, if the subject matter to
be patented [is] invented or created primarily by using an em-
ployer's resources, or if the invention-creation [arises] in the
normal course of employment, the 'service invention-creation' be-
longs to the employer."2 7 This is similar to the "shop right" pro-
visions of the United States patent law.
"A foreign applicant, that is, a person or legal entity having
no 'habitual' residence or place of business in China, may not
file a patent application directly, but must appoint an agent."12
8
However, an American applicant's right to seek patent protec-
tion in the PRC is created under international treaty, by the
principle of reciprocity, and more specifically under the 1979
Trade Agreement, and the PRC's Joint Venture Law and Law on
Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises.29 All documents must be
filed in Chinese (or in English with a Chinese translation) in
duplicate. 3
0
The patent owner may seek redress for infringement of a
patent which is defined by the 1984 Chinese Patent Law as any
unauthorized exploitation of the subject patent.131 Redress for
infringement may be obtained through an administrative or a
legal proceeding. Patent administrative authorities and the Chi-
nese People's Courts have concurrent jurisdiction over patent in-
fringement actions. 132 "Administrative agencies have the author-
ity to grant injunctions as well as to order the payment of
compensatory damages. Any patent administration authority de-
cision is appealable to a People's Court within three months of
issuance."m The lower People's Courts are not available to for-
Law).
125. See id. § 3.02 (D).
126. See id. § 3.02 (E).
127. Id. § 3.03 (A).
128. Id.
129. See id.
130. See id. § 3.03 (B) (citing Rules 4, 15 & 16).
131. See id. § 3.09 (citing Art. 64 of the 1984 Chinese Patent Law).




eign entities, but a foreign entity may sue for infringement ei-
ther in an intermediate People's Court, which is preferable, or
seek redress from the Administrative Authorities for Patent
Affairs.3
The problems with the 1984 Chinese Patent Law center
around the issue of legal remedies. Article 60 provides that pat-
entees seeking to protect their rights may directly institute legal
proceedings in the People's Court. Despite this option, the law is
directed toward an administrative resolution of problems with-
out any real indication of what procedures exist to provide such
administrative resolution. 135 For foreigners the problem is worse
than for the Chinese. The 1984 Chinese Patent Law limits itself
to administrative and criminal remedies with little or no provi-
sion for civil remedies.3 6
D. Chinese Copyright Laws
Chinese copyright law went through various stages and
took "a road as tortuous as that of Chinese intellectuals".1 37 The
first law, the Da Quing Copyright Law, was passed in 1910.38
But Chinese translations were not protected, and treaty obliga-
tions were not enforced. Foreigners were given the same protec-
tion as Chinese nationals under a new 1928 Copyright Law.
The PRC was formed in 1949, and the new government re-
pealed the previous 1928 Copyright Law. The PRC in 1950 and
1953 enacted a series of copyright provisions that recognized
only limited rights of individual authors. 3 9 Political unrest in
the 1950s and 1960s made it impossible for China to have a sys-
tem of copyright laws comparable to other countries.
A series of regulations and related measures were passed
for internal circulation only between 1980 and 1986, and they
addressed the production of written and audiovisual materials.
These pronouncements rarely addressed the issue of illegal cop-
ying or copyright per se, and they concentrated mainly on cate-
gories of potentially subversive materials.' 4°
134. See id. § 3.11 n.65
135. ALFORD, supra note 50, at 73.
136. See id. at 74.
137. See id. at 76 (citing Jiang Ping, a noted civil law specialist and head of the
Committee on Legal Affairs of the Standing Committee of the NPC in the late 1980s).
138. See Guo Shoukang, China, in INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE
CHI-5-CHJ-79 (Paul Edward Geller ed., 1995).
139. See ia. at CHI-7-CHI-8.
140. ALFORD, supra note 50, at 77.
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In 1986, the General Principles of the Civil Law were
promulgated and Article 94 of the General Principles provided
the PRC's first major public recognition of the notion of copy-
right. 41 Article 94 of the Principles of the Civil Law was very
general, providing citizens and legal persons with rights of au-
thorship (copyright), and granting them the right to sign their
names as authors, issue and publish their works, and receive re-
muneration in accordance with the law.4
A National Bureau of Copyright was established, and a new
copyright law was adopted in 1990. The PRC's first copyright
law was enacted on September 7, 1990, and June 1, 1991 was its
effective date." 3 The PRC's instrument of accession to the Berne
Convention was submitted to the World Intellectual Property
Organization and took effect in October 1992.
Implementation of the 1991 Chinese Copyright Law was ini-
tiated first by the 1979 Trade Agreement and later by the sign-
ing of a Memorandum of Understanding on May 19, 1989 be-
tween the PRC and the United States. The 1989 Memorandum
of Understanding related generally to the enactment and scope
of a new PRC copyright law.1 Implementation of the new copy-
right law was accelerated by a Super 301 investigation initiated
by the United States Trade Representative (USTR) in 1991 for
violations of intellectual property laws.
As with patent and trademark, the 1991 Chinese Copyright
Law provides a more curtailed grant of rights, especially eco-
nomic rights, than one would expect on initial examination."3
For example, Article 16 specifies that works "created by citizens
in carrying out assignments given to them by legal persons or
non-legal person units" generally belong to the author, but in
practice this broad statement of author's right is given a narrow
view. 46 The 1991 Chinese Copyright Law's fair use provisions' 47
give the state the right to make unauthorized use of copyrighted
materials "to execute official duties," with only vague protection
against prejudicing the rights of owners "without reason."1
48
This provision constitutes one of the major sources of piracy of
intellectual property by the Chinese state and its agencies.
141. See id
142. See id.
143. See id. [hereinafter Chinese Copyright Law].
144. WINEBURG, supra note 88, § 3.25.
145. ALFORD, supra note 50, at 78.
146. Id.
147. See infra text accompanying note 163 (discussing the fair use exceptions).
148. ALroRD, supra note 50, at 78-79.
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The 1991 Chinese Copyright Law is also restrictive with re-
spect to tolerance for so-called dissident political views. The law
provides that "works prohibited by law to be published and dis-
seminated" are not entitled to copyright protection and "copy-
right holders shall not violate the Constitution and the law, or
infringe upon the public interest, while exercising their
copyrights. 14
In some ways the 1991 Chinese Copyright Law provides
more rights to foreigners than it does to the Chinese. For exam-
ple, the law offers foreigners the right to earn whatever royalty
they can negotiate. Efforts were also made to assure foreigners
that restrictions of content under Article 4 would not apply as
rigidly to "acceptable works from abroad."5 But in other ways
the 1991 Chinese Copyright Law, as with patent, accords for-
eigners fewer rights than nationals. For example, Article 2 of
the 1991 Chinese Copyright Law provides that works of Chinese
citizens are protected "whether published or not," but those of
foreigners first must "be published".151 Moreover, the 1991 Chi-
nese Copyright Law vested the responsibility for administering
the law in the SCA which drew many of its personnel from the
SAPP, an organization which exercised censorship powers and
which for decades oversaw the mass production of unauthorized
copies of foreign copyrighted materials by Chinese publishers.l5r2
This is another clandestine source of the continued failure to
implement anti-piracy legislation in China.
The 1991 Chinese Copyright Law protects "literary works,
oral works, musical and dramatic and choreographic works,
works of fine art, photographic works, cinematographic televi-
sion and video works, product and engineering designs and their
explanations, maps and schematic drawings, computer pro-
grams, and other works as stipulated in laws and administra-
tive regulations" 53 Protection is also extended to adaptations,
translations, annotations and collations. 54 Implementing regula-
tions extended copyright protection to three-dimensional archi-
tectural works 5 5 and "applied art" such as utilitarian articles
149. Id. at 79.
150. Id. at 79-80.
151. Id. at 80.
152. See id.
153. WINEBURG, supra note 88, § 3.25 (citing Article 3 of the 1991 Chinese Copyright
Law).
154. See id. (citing Article 12 of the 1991 Chinese Copyright Law).
155. The Berne Convention requires protection of three-dimensional architectural
works. See WORLD INTEma PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PRO-
TECTION OF LITERARY AND AiRra r WoRKs FOM 1886 To 1986 232 (1986).
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that have ornamental features (jewelry, watches, toys, and fur-
niture). "Public documents such as regulations, administrative
or judicial reports and their official translations, as well as
news, calendars and numerical tables are explicitly excluded
from qualifying as copyrightable subject matter."156 There is no
registration requirement for copyright subject matter.
The Chinese Copyright Law protects the works of "Chinese
citizens, legal persons and units without the status of legal per-
sons of China, whether published or not."157 Copyright protection
is extended under international conventions or bilateral agree-
ments to which the PRC is a party.
158
From the time China joined the Berne Convention in 1992,
all works originating in a member of the Berne Union that were
not in the public domain in their country of origin became pro-
tected in China. Any use of an original or copy of a U.S. work
done on a commercial scale and undertaken before the establish-
ment of the bilateral copyright relations (the 1979 Trade Agree-
ment) is not actionable in China. All provisions of the Chinese
Copyright Law and its implementing regulations fully apply to
such uses undertaken after the establishment of the 1979 Trade
Agreement.15
9
Under the new 1991 Chinese Copyright Law most copy-
rights are protected for the life of the author plus fifty years.
Copyright licenses may not exceed ten years.160 Therefore, as-
signing the entire copyright does not appear to be permitted.
Compulsory licensing is also permitted in certain circum-
stances.161 An exclusive right of distribution applies to all works
and sound recordings, including making copies available by
rental. This exclusive right survives the first sale of copies.
162
The exclusive right to use the copyrighted work is further diluted by fair
use exceptions, which include: the use of a published work for individual
study, research or enjoyment; translation or reproduction in small quan-
tities of published works for classroom teaching or scientific research,
provided that such reproductions are for use by teachers or researchers
and that they are not published and distributed; use by a state entity for
the purpose of carrying out official duties; reproduction by a library,
156. WINEBURG, supra note 88, § 3.25 (citing Article 5 of the 1991 Chinese Copyright
Law).
157. Id. § 3.25 (citing Article 2 of the 1991 Chinese Copyright Law).
158. See id. (citing Article 2 of the 1991 Chinese Copyright Law).
159. See id. at n.123.
160. See id (citing Article 26 of the 1991 Chinese Copyright Law).




archive, museum or art gallery for the purpose of exhibiting or preserv-
ing a work; and gratuitous performances.
16
The fair use exceptions, legalized in the 1991 Chinese Copyright
Law, are one source of infringement and abuse by Chinese gov-
ernment officials, corporations, and individuals engaged in com-
mercial activity and piracy of copyrighted works.
Infringement of copyrighted works may give rise to civil lia-
bility (injunctions, compensation, and public apology) for the
"unauthorized publication of a work; adapting, compiling, broad-
casting or performing a work without authorization; and 'other
infringements of copyright and neighboring rights.'"164 Fines
may be imposed, and unlawful income can be confiscated if the
unauthorized reproduction and distribution of a work is in pur-
suit of profit. Similar remedies may be imposed if one publishes
a book to which another person has exclusive publication rights,
or reproduces and distributes a radio or television program
without permission.165 The 1991 Chinese Copyright Law's rem-
edy provisions are similar to those of patent and trademark
laws. Although parties have the right to proceed directly to the
People's Courts, the emphasis in China is on administrative so-
lutions with few procedural specifications for the resolution of
infringement problems.166
Software protection under the 1991 Chinese Copyright Law
has an interesting history and provides some insight into the
sources of piracy. A draft to govern the protection of software
under the 1991 Chinese Copyright Law entitled "Regulations for
the Protection of Computer Software" 167 (Computer Software
'Regulations) was circulated in early 1991 and published three
days after the 1991 Chinese Copyright Law 168 The Computer
Software Regulations seem to provide a wide range of rights,
but in reality are subject to a variety of qualifications limiting
these rights. For example, the Computer Software Regulations
fail to indicate clearly whether software is a literary work, leave
uncertain what is meant by a first publication, and do not cover
programs embedded in semiconductor chips.169 Furthermore, the
Computer Software Regulations limit the scope of rights granted
by expansive provisions regarding national interest. Article 31 of
163. Id. (citing Article 22 of the 1991 Chinese Copyright Law).
164. Id. (citing Article 46 of the 1991 Chinese Copyright Law).
165. See id.
166. ALF ORD, supra note 50, at 80.
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the Computer Software Regulations specifies that similarities
between newly developed and existing software will "not consti-
tute infringement of... copyright... if the similarity is neces-
sary for the execution of national policies, laws, regulations, and
rules ... or for the implementation of national technical stan-
dards 170 No definition is provided for "national policies" or "na-
tional technical standards" and, even worse, no compensation is
provided for software developers affected by this provision.'
71
Software published prior to the issuance of the Computer
Software Regulations on June 4, 1991, most of which belonged
to foreigners, is presumed to be in the public domain. 72 The
Computer Software Regulations exonerate persons accused of in-
fringement if they do "not know or have no reasonable basis for
knowing that the software is infringing.!173 This provision leaves
software copyright holders with the burden of having to seek out
the "suppliers" of infringing items in order to obtain redress of
grievances. These and other similar provisions in the Computer
Software Law are tantamount to a wholesale license to piracy of
intellectual property by the state. In response to China's en-
forcement procedures there is little wonder why Joseph Massey,
the Assistant United States Trade Representative, called China
the "single largest pirate world-wide." 74
Remedies for software infringement are as problematical as
the remedies for patent and trademark rights' infringement. For
example, as a prerequisite to seeking either administrative or
judicial enforcement of their rights, software developers are re-
quired to provide key proprietary data to the Ministry of Elec-
tronics Industry in a painstaking registration process. 175
The Computer Software Regulations provide limited protec-
tion for software because software is protected as an "industrial
work" rather than as a "literary work." This classification limits
the protection of software to outright piracy, that is, literal copy-
ing. Rights to the software are for one term that only lasts
twenty-five years. Under these regulations the formalities and
costs for registering a software copyright are daunting. The re-
gistration process requires providing a source code. This formal-
ity, coupled with the protection being limited to literal copying,
allow public disclosure of a source code to constitute an invita-




174. Id. at 86.
175. See id. at 81.
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tion to legalized copying of the software. The Computer Software
Regulations do not specify whether new versions of old software
require a separate registration, nor whether retroactive protec-
tion is available for software created prior to June 1, 1991. As a
result of these problems, software companies in the United
States voiced serious objections to this law. 76
China met with the United States Trade Representative in
1991 pursuant to a Section 301 investigation for piracy of
software. After this meeting China issued new regulations on
June 13, 1991 which extended copyright protection to fifty years
and did away with the requirement of a source code. Software
first published overseas would be protected if the software was
registered in China within thirty days.177 These regulations still
did not satisfy American software companies.
In order to end the Section 301 investigation, China agreed
to protect computer programs as a "literary work" under the
Berne Convention and to delete the registration formalities. The
United States agreed to release China from any duty to pay roy-
alties to software already pirated. However, software already in
the possession of government agencies, companies, and individu-
als, without license, could continue to be used as long as this
software was not further copied or distributed for commercial
purposes.178 China issued Measures for the Registration of Copy-
right in Computer Software on April 6, 1992.
China was forced to join the Berne Convention by June 30,
1992 and to join the Geneva Convention for Protection of Pro-
ducers of Phonograms by June 1, 1993. China's accession to the
Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms
Against Unauthorized Duplication of Their Phonograms was ac-
tually made on November 7, 1992.179 This law provides that
software is classified as a "literary work" and receives fifty years
protection accorded other copyrighted works. China also joined
the Universal Copyright Convention in 1992.
On July 5, 1995, the State Council of the Chinese govern-
ment promulgated "The Customs Regulations for the Protection
of Intellectual Property Rights of the People's Republic of China"
designed to provide effective protection of intellectual property
rights at the border.180 This law became effective on October 1,
1995. In accordance with this law, Chinese Customs is author-




180. See id. § 3.26.
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ized to protect intellectual property rights relating to articles ei-
ther imported into or exported out of China. Any owner of intel-
lectual property rights in China may record his rights with the
relevant Customs authorities. The owner may apply thereafter
to have Customs detain or confiscate infringing articles. The rec-
ordation is effective for seven years from the date of Customs'
approval. It is not clear whether the exclusive licensee may ap-
ply for this protection. 181 If the receiver or sender of the articles
is knowingly aware that the import or export of such articles
will infringe intellectual property rights of others, or if he
falsely reports to Customs about the status of intellectual prop-
erty rights, he will be fined up to the amount of CIP or FOB
prices of the imported or exported articles. 182
China introduced new anti-piracy legislation in 1997 as part
of a renewed campaign to curb copyright theft.'m The National
Copyright Administration said that long-standing promised
changes to China's 1991 Copyright Law will be enacted, along
with other measures, in a bid to ensure that domestic legislation
is "consistent" with international standards.'8
E. Chinese Trade Secrets
China agreed to enact a law providing for adequate protec-
tion of trade secrets to be completed by January 1, 1994.'M
F. Trade Agreements Affecting Intellectual Property
Three trade agreements affecting intellectual property were
signed between the United States and China in 1979, 1992, and
1995.
1. The 1979 Trade Agreement. After Deng Xiaoping opened
up China to market reform in 1979 and the United States and
China established diplomatic relations, the Chinese and the
Americans signed an "Agreement on Trade Relations" (1979
Trade Agreement). l8 6 The 1979 Trade Agreement basically
181. See id. § 3.26.
182. See id.
183. China 7b Revise Copyright Law 7b Meet International Standards, 11 World In-
tell. Prop. Rep. (BNA) 77, at 81 (Mar. 1997).
184. See id. at 82.
185. China Says It Will Draft Law 7b Protect Commercial Secrets, 10 World Intell.
Prop. Rep. (BNA) 381, at 385 (Dec. 1996).
186. See 1979 Trade Agreement, supra note 83. See also infra text accompanying
notes 257-67 (discussing in detail Chinese unfair trade practices).
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sought to protect American owners of patents, trademarks, and
copyrights in China.18 7 The 1979 Trade Agreement provided that
"Each Party shall seek, under its laws and with due regard to
international practice, to ensure to legal or natural persons of
the other Party protection of patents and trademarks equivalent
to the patent and trademark protection correspondingly ac-
corded by the other Party.""" Article 5 provided copyright protec-
tion to United States nationals.189 In the 1979 Trade Agreement,
the United States and China agreed to permit trademark regis-
tration on the basis of reciprocity; to ensure trademark, patent,
and copyright protection equivalent to the protection correspond-
ingly accorded by the other country; and to restrict unfair com-
petition involving the unauthorized use of industrial property."O
The 1979 Trade Agreement encouraged China to introduce
legislation in all areas of intellectual property. During the next
ten years many laws were passed and alterations and revisions
of these were promulgated. In 1980, a Patent Bureau was estab-
lished, and in 1985 a Patent Law was promulgated. In 1980,
China became a member of the World Intellectual Property Or-
ganization (WIPO),19' and in 1984 China became a member of
the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property.192
In 1982, China promulgated a comprehensive trademark law ac-
companied by implementing regulations a year later. In July
1989, China joined the Madrid Agreement for International Re-
gistration of Trademarks. 193
Despite China's introduction of legislation in all areas of in-
tellectual property during the 1980s, the United States was not
satisfied with China's continued failure to adopt more protective
anti-piracy laws. Piracy cost United States exporters approxi-
mately $10-25 million in lost sales in 1987.194 Moreover, the lack
187. See 1979 Trade Agreement, supra note 83.
188. See icl. at Art. VI, para. 3.
189. See id. at Art. VI, para, 5.
190. See id.
19L See generally, Welcome to W.LP.O., Mar. 3, 1997 <http'I/www.wipo.com> (on file
with author and the Buffalo Law Review). WIPO administers the World Intellectual
Property Treaties such as the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property,
Mar. 20, 1883, as last revised at the Stockholm Revision Conference, July 14, 1967, 21
U.S.T. 1538, 828 U.N.TS. 305, and Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as last revised in Paris, July 24, 1971, 828 U.N.T.S. 221. Id.
192. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9,
1886, as last revised at Paris, July 24, 1971, 828 U.N.TS. 221.
193. Assafa Endeshaw, A Critical Assessment of the US.-China Conflict on Intellec-
tual Property, 6 ALB. LJ. SOL & TscH. 295, 314 (1996) (citing the Madrid Agreement for
International Registration of Trademarks, July 1989).
194. 1992 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE, supra note 118.
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of copyright protection for computer software and piracy costs
American businesses approximately $70-150 million each year.
9 5
2. 1992 China-United States Memorandum of Understand-
ing on the Protection of Intellectual Property (1992 MOU). To re-
taliate against the piracy of intellectual property in the 1980s,
the USTR identified China as a "priority foreign country" on
April 26, 1991.196 Threats of a Super 301 investigation began in
1990. On May 26, 1991 the USTR initiated a Super 301 investi-
gation into the state of intellectual property protection in
China.19 7 As a result of this investigation China adopted a new
Copyright Law in 1990, the 1991 Chinese Copyright Law. A Na-
tional Bureau of Copyright was also established. Nevertheless,
threats of a trade war between China and the United States
loomed by December 1991. At the final hour China and the
United States signed a Memorandum of Understanding (1992
MOU)198 on the Protection of Intellectual Property on January
17, 1992 just after the Super 301 investigation was halted.
As required by the 1992 MOU, China acceded to the Berne
Convention on October 15, 1992 and the Universal Copyright
Convention in October of 1992. It also joined the Patent Cooper-
ation Treaty in 1992. China issued Measures for the Registra-
tion of Copyright in Computer Software on April 6, 1992.
China expected that its introduction of new laws would at-
tract foreign capital and stop, or at least reduce, criticism from
foreign investors, particularly the United States.199 Rather than
quelling American fears and objections, these new laws turned
United States' attention to China's lack of enforcement of their
own domestic intellectual property laws. United States' griev-
ances on the non-enforcement of intellectual property laws and
alleged rampant piracy piled up. The United States complained
of its trade deficit with China in 1994, estimated at between $29
and $37 billion, linking trade deficits with Chinese unfair trade
practices. Moreover, the United States claimed that intellectual
property piracy costs American industries $1 billion a year in
lost revenues adding to the deficit.
195. See id. at 42.
196. See id. at 48.
197. See id.
198. Memorandum of Understanding on the Protection of Intellectual Property, Jan.
17, 1992, US.-P.R.C., 34 I.L.M. 676 [hereinafter 1992 MOU].
199. Endeshaw, supra note 193, at 313.
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3. 1995 Agreement Regarding Intellectual Property Rights
(1995 MOU). Sino-American negotiations on intellectual prop-
erty began in June 1994 and lasted nine rounds until a new
agreement was finally reached in 1995. During these negotia-
tions eight issues were presented for Chinese agreement. The
most important issues involved access to China's market,
tougher action against copyright infringement, and the closure
of twenty-nine alleged pirating factories in southern China,
some of which were state owned. 20° The dispute between China
and the United States forced the USTR representative, Mickey
Kantor, on February 4, 1995 to announce that the dreaded Sec-
tion 301 sanctions would be imposed against Chinese goods if an
agreement were not reached by February 25, 1995.
The areas of dispute between the Chinese and the Ameri-
cans were identified clearly in a study of the United States
Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA). The study identified
problems such as the misappropriation of intellectual property,
imposition of ad hoc taxes and charges, corruption, smuggling,
frequent sweeping changes in laws and regulations, and the
blurring of lines of authority.20 1 In addition to these charges, the
prohibition on foreign law firms to handle Chinese legal affairs
or to appear before Chinese courts impeded foreign proprietors
of intellectual property from pursuing their claims against al-
leged infringers.2 2 China responded to this particular criticism
by introducing an arbitration procedure to handle disputes aris-
ing from the lag between legislation and enforcement.
In 1995, American opposition to Chinese piracy practices
mounted and resulted in threatened sanctions. China responded
by threatening to retaliate against the United States with sanc-
tions. China also threatened retaliation against the big three
American car makers and to suspend new ventures with United
States companies in the chemical, audiovisual, and car sectors,
if the Section 301 sanctions were implemented.
Throughout the volatile period in which the United States
and China were close to a trade war, the United States adopted
a contradictory trade policy. The United States increased its vo-
cal protest against Chinese intellectual property piracy and in-
creased its demands for market access while increasing its trade
and business transactions with the pirating nation. The Ameri-
cans insisted that economic and political barriers to the entry of
United States products into China's entertainment market en-
200. See id. at 315.
201. See id. at 316.
202. See id. at 315.
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courage piracy because "bootleggers step in to meet demands for
foreign movies, compact discs, and tapes unavailable from the
legal producers."
20 3
The United States' contradictory trade policy toward China
was visible in February 1995, around the time threats of sanc-
tions were being made by the USTR against China. At that
time, the United States signed thirty-four contracts worth more
than $6 billion in Beijing, eight contracts worth $2 billion in
Shanghai on energy efficiency technology development and nu-
clear fuel research, and twenty-six joint ventures valued at $4
billion in renewable energy, electricity, gas and oil.204 A trade
war with China seemed imminent, but this did not stop the
United States from jockeying to remain in the Chinese market
by concluding new contracts. To push China into a trade war
with the United States and impose sanctions for piracy would
result in American businesses losing to European or other com-
petitors. This contradictory policy continues in the 1990s, and
has been linked to the Clinton campaign finance practices.
20 5
Certain industries in America, like the aerospace compa-
nies, are keen on capturing a bigger share of the aerospace mar-
ket in China and are less interested in retaliation against intel-
lectual property piracy. But the American entertainment and
high-technology companies, which lose billions of dollars in lost
sales to pirating, desire tougher action against China. This con-
flict within American industries has not helped the American
position toward piracy of intellectual property in China. The
Chinese recognized the value of the schism within the American
industries and attempted to exploit it to their advantage by
threatening to retaliate.
206
China has its own needs just as do the Americans, and this
mutuality makes trade negotiation on intellectual property and
market access feasible. China needs United States investments
and imports to transform its labor-intensive factories to high-
capital, high-technology factories.20 7 China is eager to join the
WTO, and China does not want to be excluded from the huge
203. See id. at 316 (citing Both Sides Report Progress in US.-China Trade Negotia-
tions, LA Tmcs, Feb. 24, 1995, at D2).
204. See id. at 318.
205. See id. Many people believe that politics as well as economics guides U.S. trade
policy towards China. The recent campaign scandal has been linked to U.S. trade policy.
See David E. Sanger, Clinton Effort on Freer Trade is Losing Steam, N. Y. TMs, June 9,
1997, at Al ("China's entry into the World Trade Organization [has] been bogged
down... the campaign finance scandal is to blame ...




United States market. In fact, both sides need each other and a
trade war would not benefit either country.
In light of the contradictory American trade policy and fears
of a trade war, an important trade agreement was signed on
February 26, 1995.208 This agreement, referred to as the 1995
Memorandum of Understanding on the Agreement on the En-
forcement of Intellectual Property Rights (1995 MOU), was de-
signed to enforce China's intellectual property laws and combat
piracy. The 1995 MOU set forth guidelines and requirements for
both an immediate crackdown on intellectual property piracy
and a long-term strategy for the enforcement of intellectual
property rights.209 The 1995 MOU was cheered as an important
victory for the Clinton Administration and for American busi-
ness. 210 The 1995 MOU produced euphoria and jubilation by
United States businesses due to what they perceived of as a suc-
cess against piracy in China.2
11
The 1995 MOU extends the 1992 MOU provisions and at-
tempts to remedy Chinese infractions of intellectual property
rights by reforming and reinforcing Chinese law which prohibits
the illegal copying of intellectual property within China.212 The
1995 MOU authorizes China's State Council Working Confer-
ence on Intellectual Property (Working Conference) to develop
an Action Plan to punish Chinese violations of intellectual prop-
erty rights.2
13
In the 1995 MOU, China also made concessions that
changed existing Chinese regulations. For example, one provi-
sion allows trademark agents in China to act not only on behalf
of Chinese persons but also foreign individuals. This provision
requires changes in Chinese law in order to allow foreign indi-
viduals with trademarks to be as equally protected as Chinese
individuals under Chinese law.
214
China also agreed to make new customs regulations to be
entered into force by October 1, 1995.215 The new regulations
208. Agreement Regarding Intellectual Property Rights, Feb. 26, 1995, US.-P.R.C.,
34 LL.M. 881 [hereinafter 1995 MOU].
209. Marc D. Latman, Note, China's Continued Failures to Enforce its Intellectual
Property Agreements, 34 INDEP. hNT'L LJ. 6-7 (1996).
210. Endeshaw, supra note 193, at 324.
21L See id.
212. Frank Prohaska, The 1995 Agreement Regarding Intellectual Property Rights
Between China and the United States: Promises for International Law or Continuing
Problems with Chinese Piray?, 4 TuLsA J. CoMp. & JIrL L. 169, 173 (1996).
213. See id.
214. 1995 MOU, supra note 208, at Article 1(D)(4)(b), 896, 897.
215. See id. at 900.
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clarify the status of imported or exported goods that infringe on
intellectual property rights. The new regulations empower cus-
toms agents to enforce the necessary and applicable Chinese
laws prohibiting infringing goods from entering or leaving
China. Chinese customs agents must also enforce copyrights
where the applicant for enforcement presents legal proof of cop-
yright which can be satisfied by a copyright registration certifi-
cate of that nation in compliance with the Berne Convention.
216
Chinese customs will enforce trademarks if the applicant has a
"Trademark Registration Certificate" or confirms the well-known
status of the unregistered marks.217
China continues to violate customs laws affecting intellec-
tual property by engaging in clandestine traffic of exports
through Hong Kong. Sometimes a Hong Kong label is deftly
placed on a product and is shipped as if originating out of Hong
Kong rather than China.2 18 This illegal export practice costs the
United States billions of dollars.
Generally, the 1995 MOU provides: (1) tougher penalties for
piracy, including revocation of business licenses and criminal
prosecutions for serious offenders; (2) stiffer customs checks at
China's borders and increased powers for customs officers to
search and destroy; (3) an immediate halt of all exports of coun-
terfeit goods from China; (4) transparency of censorship and
other rules and more access to the enforcement system (the
court system, in particular, where the United States could seek
legal sanctions and financial penalties against infringing Chi-
nese businesses); (5) lifting of all import restrictions (such as
quotas and licensing requirements) on United States' products
which were believed to have been the major cause for piracy; (6)
the establishment of joint ventures to produce, distribute and
sell United States' works in China; and (7) the submission of a
regular report by China on the state of the enforcement of intel-
lectual property rights in China with regard to the United
States.219
Skepticism about the efficacy of the 1995 MOU abounds.20
One wonders whether Beijing can actually enforce this agree-
ment against offenders in far away provinces which have grown
216. Prohaska, supra note 212, at 175.
217. 1995 MOU, supra note 208, at Article 1(GX2) (for a complete discussion of the
customs enforcement provisions).
218. Raymond Bonner, Altering Labels, Not Clothes, China Sidesteps Trade Limits,
N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 1, 1997, at Al.
219. Endeshaw, supra note 193, at 326.
220. Prohaska, supra note 212, at 179.
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accustomed to running their own show. 1 Some suspect that the
pirates are often well-connected, maybe even government offi-
cials, and for this reason the central government cannot exert
full control over provincial leaders and powerful army officers
tied to local industries making hefty profits without paying i-
censing fees.Y2
Another serious problem is that Chinese courts are popu-
lated with political appointees or have inadequately trained
staff which discourages foreigners from filing claims in Chinese
courts.223 China has been accused of exploiting the United
States' open market while closing their market to United States
products. They have used a whole array of non-tariff barriers,
quotas, licensing requirements, sanitary standards not based on
scientific principles, and other laws and regulations to keep
American and other competitive foreign products out of China.m
China's failure to adequately comply with the 1995 MOU
Agreement on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights
caused the United States government to once again threaten
trade Section 301 sanctions. If China had failed to show signifi-
cant compliance with the 1995 agreement by February 26, 1996,
the United States threatened to enact $1 billion in trade sanc-
tions against China by means of a Section 301 proceeding.22
G. Piracy of Intellectual Property in China
1. Quantification. "Throughout the 1980s and well into the
1990s China's publishers liberally reproduced foreign materials
without authorization. 6 Students in China can find libraries,
research centers, and computer centers filled with unauthorized
copies of foreign works and software.2 27 Consumers in China
may avail themselves of pirated editions of foreign works in
state-owned bookstores unavailable to foreigners. 22 Domestic
piracy exists as well, and Chinese pharmaceutical manufactur-
ers have found their marks infringed.2 9 Den Xiaoping's daugh-
ter successfully brought a copyright infringement case against
22L Endeshaw, supra note 193, at 326.
222. See id
223. See id.
224. See i& at 331.
225. See Latman, supra note 209, at 7.
226. ALFORD, supra note 50, at 86.
227. See id.
228. See id.
229. See id. at 87.
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an infringer of her biography of her father.2 0 Infringement is
rampant in China, and administrative and formal legal redress
for copyright infringement is difficult to secure.231 To combat the
problem in 1994, the Standing Committee of the NPC adopted
legislation imposing substantial criminal penalties for copyright
infringement while the State Council issued a White Paper
praising progress over the past decade on intellectual prop-
erty.2 2 This legislation resulted in the death penalty of four in-
dividuals, life sentences for five others, and imprisonment of
some 500 more for trademark violations.233 But major problems
in intellectual property piracy still persist.
Approximately twenty-five percent of American exports con-
sist of intellectual property.23 Chinese piracy of American goods
has been reported to cause a $1 billion-plus loss to United States
businesses.2-5 The American computer corporation Microsoft has
reportedly lost up to $30 million due to rampant piracy in
China.236 Chinese piracy continues fairly unabated, and massive
quantities of pirated goods show up in United States ports.
237
Chinese officials reportedly seized 1.89 million CDs, 752,000
videos and audio cassettes, 37,000 software programs and
450,000 published works.Y Experts estimate that 95 percent of
the software in use in China consists of unauthorized copies.2 9
Eric Smith, President of the International Intellectual Property
Alliance, estimated that 28 to 35 Chinese plants continue to
manufacture counterfeit CDs.24° In June 1994, USTR Mickey
Kantor stated that enforcement of copyright law in China is
"virtually non-existent 241
Estimated United States losses in 1995 due to copyright
piracy in general topped $14 billion.242 These estimates cover
230. See id. at 88.
231. See id
232. See id. at 91.
233. See id. at 92.
234. See id. at 178 (citing John T. Masterson, Protection of Intellectual Property
Rights in International Transactions, 863 PLI CoRp. 33 (1994)).
235. Prohaska, supra note 212, at 177.
236. See id-
237. See id at 179.
238. See id.
239. ALFOmD, supra note 50, at 91.
240. See Prohaska, supra note 212, at 179.
241. See ALFORD, supra note 50, at 91.
242. Copyright Piracy Losses Top $14 Billion, IIPA Estimates, 11 World Intell. Prop.
Rep. (BNA) 77, at 94 (Mar. 1997) (announcing results of an industry survey by the Inter-




losses due to inadequate copyright laws and enforcement in-
curred by American authors, producers, and distributors of
software products, movies, television programs and home videos,
music and sound recordings, and books, reference works, jour-
nals, and similar publications. In 1995, the International Intel-
lectual Property Alliance identified China as the country where
American copyright industries suffered the greatest loss. Total
software losses in China topped $2.3 billion in 1995, more than
double the losses experienced in any other overseas market.2'4
2. Chinese Efforts to Combat Piracy. Since the 1995 MOU
was signed, the Chinese government claims it conducted "3,000
raids, destroyed 2 million pirated compact discs and laser discs,
700,000 pirated videos, and 400,000 pirated books and began
over 1,000 possible criminal copyright infringement cases."2 "
During 1995, China investigated twenty-nine CD factories
known as infringers on US copyrights. But as soon as the facto-
ries were closed during the investigation, the Chinese govern-
ment relicensed all but one of these CD factories.2m
Recently, on January 21, 1997, government authorities re-
ported that China would introduce new anti-piracy legislation as
part of a renewed campaign to curb copyright theft.M Officials
claim to have achieved remarkable success in closing under-
ground CD factories after posting cash rewards for information
leading to the arrest of black market operators.247 Authorities in
South China's Guangdong province, the center of the nation's
bootleg trade in pirated disks and software, said twenty-nine
black market factories had been closed as of January 15, 1997
following a month-long special enforcement period.M
Recently, China has stepped up its intellectual property pro-
tection in the courts. In the first ten months of 1996 Chinese
courts heard 341 cases concerning copyrights, representing a
243. See id.
244. See Barshefsky, supra note 49.
245. See id.
246. China to Revise Copyright Law to Meet International Standards, supra note
183, at 81.
247. See id. at 82. In commenting about China, U.S.T-R. Charlene Barshefsky said
that China has "begun to take meaningful, serious action to halt CD export piracy since
a June 1996 agreement [was signed]. Close to 40 underground production facilities have
been closed, over 250 people have been arrested with resulting jail sentences being
handed down .... At the same time, pirate production of CDs ... continues to be a se-
rious problem.! Problems Remain in China, 11 World Intell. Prop. Rep. (BNA) 181, at
197 (June 1997) (internal quotations omitted).
248. See id.
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6.2% increase from 1995.20
3. China's Inability to Enforce Anti-Piracy Agreements. The
difficulty in reducing or deterring piracy in China is linked, but
not limited, to economic advantage. Pirating in China is too
profitable a business, and if stopped, may even detract from the
growth of the booming Chinese economy. 150 Chinese citizens
stand to lose money and jobs if their government were to en-
force and comply with its agreements with the United States re-
garding copyright and trade.21 Some central government agen-
cies, province officials, and other local Chinese government
officials are allegedly connected to the pirating.2 52 It appears
that Chinese officials have a vested interest in seeing China's
pirating industry succeed. Moreover, China's overt and covert
trade practices discourage imports of the very products which
the Chinese need. Decreased supply encourages the Chinese to
resort to bootlegging and pirating to meet the market demand.
In November 1996, experts reported that piracy was ram-
pant in Asia, especially in China and India, where entrepre-
neurs reportedly install technology to receive broadcasts and
then retransmit them to entire neighborhoods.2
3
The failure to reduce or eradicate piracy of intellectual
property in China is also due to the serious misperceptions of
the very notion of ownership by the Chinese people and by their
government leaders. It is more than likely that people do not
perceive copying a CD as an illegal act, for they do not under-
stand the very nature of the ownership of a copyright or posses-
sion of a proprietary interest in property. For many years before
and even after the 1979 transition to a market economy, China
had adopted a socialist ideology which inculcates state owner-
ship of the means of production and discourages private owner-
ship of property. To some people in communist countries owning
249. Chinese Courts 7b Step Up IP Protection Efforts, available in 1997 WL 8487
(1997) (citing Xinhua English Newswire of Jan. 9, 1997).
250. Latman, supra note 209, at 8.
251. The US.-China Intellectual Property Rights Agreement and Related Trade Is-
sues, 1996: Joint Hearing before the Subcomm. on International Economic Policy and
Trade and Asia and the Pacific of the Comm. on International Relations House of Repre-
sentatives and the Subcomm. on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Senate Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 104th Cong. 57 (1996) (statement of Jason S. Berman, Chairman and
CEO of Recording Industry Association of America).
252. Latman, supra note 209, at 8.
253. Asian Broadcasters Call for Tough Copyright Laws to Prevent Piracy, available
in 1996 WL 649540 (1996) (citing Global Broadcasters Urge Stiff Copyright Laws to Pre-
vent Abuse, Agence France-Presse, Nov. 7, 1996).
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property is tantamount to a sin. Thus, stealing an object that is
owned by someone else is less corrupt than owning it outright
yourself. The lack of supply of goods in China resulted in theft,
bribery, graft, corruption and a never ending search for devious
means to go around the system as a way of survival. The Chi-
nese proverb "To steal a book is an elegant offense" gives insight
into the mentality of the Chinese toward intellectual property
piracy. Moreover, a general lack of faith in the legal system in
China makes piracy an especially difficult crime to deter.
H. Effect of China's Pirating of Intellectual Property on Trade
Without the incentive for enforcement of its intellectual
property laws and agreements, China is unlikely to conform to
international standards regarding intellectual property set forth
by the WTO.254 China needs support for entry into the WTO,
due to China's withdrawal from the General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade in 1949.255 The European Union Commission
wants China to enter the WTO, but still has concerns regarding
Chinas internal barriers to trade and Chinas unwillingness to
adhere to -minimum rules of trade etiquette.216
I. China's Unfair Trade Practices which Impact on Piracy
Recently, China has run a huge trade surplus with the
United States which arose after Tiananmen Square and during
the 1991-1992 recession. 257 The surplus stems from several fac-
tors including unfair trade practices. Ambassador Hummel ex-
plained it by saying, "China is trying to export like a capitalist
and import like a communist."2 8
China seeks liberal access to foreign markets but limits ac-
cess to its own market by restricting the availability of foreign
exchange for imports; by subsidizing exports; by using secret
rules to manage imports; and by engaging in a host of non-tariff
barriers which impede import trade. 59 China fails to publish
many secret rules which hinder trade. They maintain quotas
and import controls on certain products. They keep tariffs on
imports at a high level. They do not publish market information.
254. Latman, supra note 209, at 9.
255. GATT, supra note 11.
256. Trade and Politics: EU Hails US.-China Pact on Intellectual Property, WALL ST.
J. Emn, Feb. 28, 1995, at 2.
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They engage in import substitution measures which discourage
imports. They have certain safety and health restrictions which
are not justified by scientific evidence and which prevent im-
ports.26 "The Chinese government promotes official and unoffi-
cial policies that fly in the face of... US-China trade agree-
ments regarding market access . . . f261 China restricts trade
with the United States by using informal quotas, slow censor-
ship approval, and complete disapproval of goods which fail to
meet formal censorship requirements. 262 China's use of quotas,
its slow approvals and outright disapprovals, limit the quanti-
ties of American products that can enter China. China also
utilizes prohibitively high taxation and tariff rates to limit
American imports and sales in China.263 Recently, China im-
posed a fifty percent royalty tax on the published tariff rate for
sound recordings and video cassettes in order to limit imports.26
While Chinese unfair trade practices have contributed to a
decrease in imports from the United States, American practice
has also contributed to its own trade deficit with China. Sanc-
tions threatened or imposed by the United States on China have
been an important factor in the decrease in American imports to
China. China is less inclined to open its door to United States
products because of continuous threats by the United States of
trade sanctions under Super and Special 301 Proceedings,2 65
threats to remove China's Most-Favored-Nation trade status,
and caveats to refuse China's entry into the WTO. Since Ameri-
can export credits are not as generous as those of other nations,
many of the biggest deals in China go to non-American compa-
nies.2 In addition, many Chinese exports originate from Ameri-
can companies manufacturing products more cheaply in China
and exporting them to other places, including the United States.
This helps American companies compete globally, but it leads to
a surge of exports from China back into the United States.
26 7
Each of these factors contributes to a decrease in imports of
American products, especially high-technology products which
260. See i& at 389.
261. Latman, supra note 209, at 10.
262. See id.
263. See id.
264. See i& at 10-11.
265. Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2411-20 (1994) [hereinafter
Section 301]. See also infra text accompanying notes 267-82, (discussing Section 301
and Super 301).
266. OVERHOLT, supra note 18, at 381-82.
267. See i& at 382.
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are easily pirated, a practice which results in encouraged boot-
legging and piracy.
J. United States Remedies for Chinese Piracy
1. Section 301. Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974268
arose from the need perceived by the United States to strike
back against unfair trade practices that were not enforced by
GATT panel condemnation. 2 9 Section 301 permits the United
States Trade Representative (USTR) to investigate and impose
sanctions on countries whose trade practices are found to be un-
fair to American interests. Reaching beyond the GATT, Section
301 gives the United States unilateral power to penalize coun-
tries that threaten American interests. 270 Section 301 is used to
enforce United States' rights under multilateral and bilateral
trade agreements, as well as, to remedy unreasonable, unjustifi-
able or discriminatory foreign trade practices that restrict or
burden United States trade.271 Section 301 contains both
mandatory and discretionary provisions and specific timetables
for actions by the USTR.
Section 301 was designed to give the President of the
United States great flexibility in resolving trade disputes. 272 An
amendment to Section 301 of the Omnibus Trade and Competi-
tiveness Act of 1988273 transferred final decision-making author-
ity in Section 301 cases from the President to the USTR.
The United States has used Section 301 with increasing fre-
quency to impose sanctions on countries whose trade practices it
does not like. For example, since 1974 ninety-eight cases have
been investigated under Section 301.274 While Section 301 has
empowered the United States to take action in trade disputes,
the implementation of Section 301 has resulted in negative
world opinion and retaliatory trade sanctions by the European
Union and Asia.2 75
268. Section 301, supra note 265.
269. A. Lynne Puckett, Rules, Sanctions and Enforcement under Section 301: At
Odds with the WTO? 90 Am J. Im'L L 675, 687 (1996).
270. See id.
271. 271 Section 301, supra note 265, § 2411(d)(4)(A)..
272. Pucket, supra note 269, at 676.
273. Trade Act of 1988, supra note 14, § 1301(a) (transferring the authority to the
United States Trade Representative subject to the direction, if any, from the President).
274. Puckett, supra note 269, at 675.
275. See, eg., Puckett, supra note 269, at n.11; Tom Buerkle, EU Blasts US. Tariffs
on Japanese Automobiles, lm'L HERALD TRm., May 18, 1995, at 1 (criticizing Sir Leon
Brittan, Commissioner for Trade of the European Union); David E. Sanger, United
States Finds Itself Virtually Alone in Japan T-ade, N.Y. TiMEs, May 29, 1995, at Al (crit-
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2. Special 301 and Super 301. The Trade Act of 1988 ad-
ded two specific categories of Section 301 actions. "Special 301"
is designed to protect foreign intellectual property rights in de-
veloping countries and to increase American bargaining power
in international trade negotiations.276 "Super 301" requires the
USTR to identify and investigate "priority practices" of foreign
governments that significantly affect American trade.
2 77
Special 301, which is a subset of Super 301,278 requires the
USTR to identify countries that do not protect intellectual prop-
erty rights. Countries whose policies adversely affect the United
States must be identified as "priority foreign countries" and in-
vestigated. The USTR is to select countries with the most egre-
gious practices of denying "adequate and effective protection of
intellectual property rights. 2 79 The USTR threatened China
with a Special 301 in 1995. As a result of a Special 301 investi-
gation and an agreement on enforcement entered into in June,
1996, China has begun to take serious action to halt CD export
piracy. The United States government will continue to monitor
China's implementation of the 1995 and 1996 enforcement
agreements as set forth in Section 306 of The Trade Act of 1988.
The USTR recently announced the steepest tariffs in the history
of Section 301--one-hundred percent tariffs on $1.08 billion of
Chinese imports, in an effort to make the Chinese comply with
intellectual property laws.280
Super 301 requires the identification of priority practices
that pose major barriers to trade and whose elimination will sig-
nificantly benefit the United States.281 Six Super 301 cases have
been investigated by the USTR. The USTR threatened a Super
301 investigation against China in 1991. Super 301 is a danger-
ous provision because it further entrenches the practice of main-
taining lists of unfair trade practices quantified in terms of arbi-
trary estimates of impact. 282 This provision expired under
icizing Asian leaders).
276. Amy E. Simpson, Copyright Law and Software Regulations in the People's Re-
public of China: Have the Chinese Pirates Affected World Trade? 20 N.C.J. INT'L L. &
Com& REG. 575 (1988).
277. See 19 US.C. § 2242(a)(1)(A) (containing the Special 301 provisions); 19 U.S.C.
§ 2420(a)(1XA) & (B) (as amended) (containing the Super 301 provisions).
278. Simpson, supra note 276.
279. 19 U.S.C. § 2242(aX1XA).
280. Puckett, supra note 269, at 680. See also Office of the US. Trade Representa-
tive's Fact Sheet on Special 301 Intellectual Property Lists, Released Apr. 30, 1997, 11
World Intell. Prop. Rep. (BNA) 181, at 208 (June 1997).
281. 19 US.C. § 2420(a)(1XA) & (B) (as amended).
282. Puckett, supra note 269, at 681.
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President Bush, was reinstated by an executive order issued by
President Clinton, but has slowly been phasing out.
3. Section 337 Procedures. Section 337 of the Tariff Act of
1930284 allows holders of United States intellectual property
rights to obtain expedited relief from the United States Interna-
tional Trade Commission (ITC) against imports which infringe
upon these rights.2 The ITC estimated that the annual loss to
the United States in intellectual property as a result of unfair
trade practices was between $43-$71 billion.2 6 Section 337 relief
is not available to those injured by domestic infringers. Since
the burden of Section 337 falls mainly on foreign producers, the
separate treatment of Section 337, like the Section 301 sanc-
tions which encourage unilateral action, seem to run afoul of the
GATT requirements. Section 337 has been the target of litiga-
tion both in the federal courts and in the dispute resolution
mechanism of the GATT.287
4. WTO, Section 301, TRIPS and China. Recognizing that
the GATT lacked enforcement power, the United States sought
to improve, strengthen, and increase the transparency of the
GATT dispute settlement procedures and to ensure that all the
Uruguay Round Agreements were subject to a single effective
dispute settlement system which the World Trade Organization
(WTO) provided.m The WTO, which was created on January 1,
1995 and is housed in Geneva, may emerge as the real force
shaping world trade. The legislation implementing the WTO did
not limit the broad sweep of Section 301, and the legislative his-
tory of the implementing statute is clear in this respect.289 While
some argue that Section 301 is outside the WTO, others argue
that Congress did not intend the WTO dispute resolution pro-
cess to displace the unilateral power vested in the USTR by Sec-
tion 301.
The strength of the WTO will depend on its leadership and
on the political pressures driving national positions which must
be balanced against fairness in WTO decision making. The dis-
283. See id. at 680-68L
284. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1930).
285. Ernest P. Shriver, Separate But Equal: Intellectual Property Importation and
the Recent Amendments to Section 337, 5 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADnE 441 (1996).
286. See id. at 442.
287. See id.
288. Puckett, supra note 269, at 688.
289. See id.
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pute resolution mechanism of the WTO, which still maintains
the power by one nation to block a recommendation, is composed
of nations with a common view toward the benefit of free trade.
However, these same nations have opposing views, policies and
needs. In seeking to make the WTO the arbiter of world trade
by reducing divergent interests within the organization, the
United States may wish to move away from the use of Section
301 in order to better act out its role as a team player. However,
a decision by the United States not to enact Section 301 sanc-
tions would be at the risk of losing its unilateral power over a
country like China whose piracy of intellectual property is ram-
pant and difficult to police.
All member nations of the WTO accept all the same rights
and responsibilities of the agreement. As such, a member nation
must comply with the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property (TRIPS) of GATT.290 TRIPS creates uniform
laws of intellectual property, and each member nation must pro-
tect the copyrights of foreign nationals of other WTO countries,
no less favorably than the copyrights of their own nationals.291
However, developing nations or "less developed countries"
(LDCs) have five years from admittance into the WTO before
they have to adopt, implement and enforce the laws in compli-
ance with TRIPS.
2 92
China is currently lobbying the 111 members of the WTO to
be admitted in the organization as a member in the category of
a LDC. However, entrance into the WTO as an LDC would al-
low China to continue its trade policy of export-led growth and
protectionism for at least another five years. The five-year wait-
ing period for implementation and enforcement of the TRIPS
agreement would also dissuade China from taking a more ag-
gressive role in the eradication of its pirating of intellectual
property. These factors discourage the United States from al-
lowing China's accession into the WTO.
The WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) 293 is a
multilateral approach to obtain a dispute settlement and implies
that one member nation should not use unilateral sanctions
against an other WTO nation without first going through the
290. Latman, supra note 209, at 12.
291. See id.
292. See id. at 13.
293. See Richard 0. Cunningham, Dispute Settlement in the WTO: Did We Get What
the United States Wants Or Did We Give Up The Only Remedy That Really Worked? at
549 (PLI Cora. L. & Prac. Course Handbook Series No. 722, 1995).
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WTO dispute settlement mechanism. 29 ' Between the United
States and the rest of the WTO community there is a debate as
to whether the United States can unilaterally use its Section
301 sanctions including Special 301 and Super 301 to gain lever-
age over an offending WTO member nation.295 During the last
round of GATT talks in Uruguay, the member nations of GATT
claimed that the United States' use of Section 301 sanctions
against a member nation is inconsistent with its obligations
under GATT and, therefore, violates the GATT agreement.296
With respect to the WTO, use by the United States of its Sec-
tion 301 sanctions could result in Dispute Settlement Under-
standing-authorized counter retaliations. 7
The Clinton Administration believes that "there is no basis
for concern that the... Dispute Settlement Understanding will
make future [United States] Administrations more reluctant to
apply Section 301 sanctions that may be inconsistent with
United States trade obligations because such sanctions could en-
gender DSU-authorized counter retaliations. 298 Nevertheless,
the fear of risking DSU-authorized counter retaliation motivated
the United States' decision not to enact Section 301 sanctions
against Japan in a recent trade dispute regarding Japan's fail-
ure to open its borders to American manufactured auto parts.
29
K. United States' Trade with China
The American big stick policy toward China may be part of
the very problem it seeks to solve: the piracy of intellectual
property. Refusal by China to buy American products encour-
ages bootlegging and piracy in China and elsewhere. The United
States currently has a $3.7 billion trade deficit with China for
March 1997, compared with $2.7 billion a year ago.31° This trade
deficit puts further pressure on the Clinton Administration to
force China into lowering a vast array of trade barriers precisely
at the time that the issue of China's entry into the WTO is be-
ing negotiated in Geneva.30 1 The United States is plagued with
the dilemma of whether to take a hard line on market access is-
294. See id at 4-7.
295. See id at 2.
296. See idt at 7.
297. See id-
298. See id.
299. Cunningham, supra note 293, at 9-11.
300. David E. Sanger, Trade Gap Grows, Complicating Visit By Gore to Beijing, N.Y.
Tnms, Mar. 21, 1997, at Al.
301. See id.
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sues or rather to appear to soften on Chinese trade issues on
the theory that exports and economic engagement with China
are sustaining high-paying jobs in the United States. While the
United States just signed a $1 billion dollar Boeing aircraft deal
with China, as well as a General Motors contract in March
1997, the Administration continues to waver on trade policy
issues. 0
2
It is common knowledge that the United States simply can-
not afford to alienate either China or Russia. China's economic
success story, which is due no doubt to the additive effect of the
economic successes of Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, Thai-
land and Singapore, 33 is very different from the sad tale of Rus-
sia's economic decline. American trade relations with Asia have
always been coupled with misperceptions because Americans
know less about Asia than they do about Europe and Canada.304
Misperceptions about China derive from faulty analogies of
China with the former Soviet Union,30 5 and more recently with
the dramatic image of Tiananmen Square and China's continued
practice of human rights violations.3°6
The United States needs to demystify China, which was
once thought of as an impoverished communist nation and
which, when and if it begins to succeed economically, could be-
come the next aggressor nation, a new Cold War enemy. ° This
myth must be dispelled and attempts must be made to create
more understanding and appreciation for the Chinese nation.
Americans must respect China's differences and must under-
stand the source of its views toward intellectual property which
reflect years of communist ideology where ownership of private
302. See id.
303. Overholt, supra note 18, at 333-35.
304. See itt at 400.
305. 305 Russia, not China, Ought to be the Focus of American Policy, INVL HERALD
TaM., Mar. 21, 1997, at 10 (The conventional wisdom now has it that China will be the
superpower of the 21st century, ready and able to challenge the United States, while
Russia will indefinitely remain in political disarray and economic anarchy!).
306. William Pfaff, Again We Overestimate Chinese Strength, INT'L HERALD TR.,
Nov. 6, 1993, at 6 ("Modern China had virtually no active influence on international soci-
ety until the 1950's and 1960's as a result of Chinas industrial advances and the Viet-
nam War").
307. See Richard Bernstein & Ross H. Munro, China I: The Coming Conflict with
America, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 18 (espousing the view that America's number
one objective in Asia must be to derail Chinas quest to become a 21st-century hegem-
ony); Robert S. Ross, China ff: Beijing as a Conservative Power, FoREIGN AFF., Mar.-Apr.
1997, at 33 (espousing the opposite point of view that there is no 'China threat," not be-




property was considered a sin. China's more distant history re-
flects a reverence for the past and a practice of legitimized copy-
ing. China's attempts to reeducate its people and to enforce its
domestic intellectual property laws, as well as its international
trade agreements affecting intellectual property should be
viewed as a positive sign worthy of American positive reinforce-
ment. Continued threats of Section 301 sanctions do not create
a climate of positive reinforcement for U.S.-Chinese trade.
II. RussIA
A. History of Intellectual Property Laws in Russia and
Russian Compliance with International Intellectual Property
Conventions
The history and development of intellectual property laws
in Russia reflect its political ideology. The very notion of owner-
ship of private property, which is at the heart of intellectual
property legislation, is anathema to socialist ideology. In 1936,
Soviet rulers proclaimed the definition of socialism as "the erad-
ication of private ownership of the means of production and of
the exploitation of man by man that private property entails." 30 8
Thus, Soviet leaders dispensed with intellectual property law as
it is known in market systems, and instead created special well-
funded research institutes for the development of new scientific
and industrial techniques.3°9 While Soviet scientists were consid-
ered privileged members of their society, the scientists had no
economic stake in the exploitation of their inventions. 310 Al-
though Soviet science produced many extraordinary achieve-
ments, in some areas surpassing Western scientific achieve-
ments, Soviet industry grew increasingly backward.311
The Soviet legislature conceived and implemented copyright
law in the Soviet Union to advance its socialist ideology which
was fundamentally opposed to private ownership of property.
But Soviet laws were inconsistent with the goals of post-Soviet
Russia and its new direction toward the adoption of a market
economy
312
308. Paul B. Stephan m, The Fall--Understanding the Collapse of the Soviet Sys-
tem, 29 SunrOLK U. I REv. 17, 18 (1995) (citing Konst. S.S.S.R. Arts. 1-12 (1936)).
309. See id. at 32.
310. See id.
311. See id. at 33.
312. Lana C. Fleishman, The Empire Strikes Back: The Influence of The United
States Motion Picture Industry on Russian Copyright Law, 26 ComELL INL L.J. 189
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Intellectual property legislation dates back to the time of
Tzar Nicholas I. Imperialist Russia enacted its first uniform
copyright law in 1911.313 The USSR refused to become a member
of the Berne Union and did not sign the Berne Convention until
1990. Following the overthrow of the imperialist government in
1917, the Bolshevik regime passed new copyright legislationaiming to eradicate any principle of free market from the copy-
right laws of Russia. 14 The 1917 Decree gave the Soviet govern-
ment a monopoly for a five-year period over the classic works of
pre-Soviet famous authors who were already deceased. In 1918,
this Decree was extended to provide the Soviet government with
a five-year monopoly over the works of living authors.3'1
The Soviet government enacted the Fundamental Principles
of Civil Legislation (Copyright Law) in 1925 which was adopted
almost verbatim by the Soviet Republics in their own statutes.3 16
Early domestic Soviet copyright law was incorporated in the
1925 Fundamental Principles of Civil Legislation,3 17 the republi-
can Civil Code,31 8 and in many other legislative decrees, 3 19 as
well as the Russian Constitution of 1977 which guaranteed So-
viet citizens freedom of scientific and artistic creation "in accor-
dance with the goals of communist construction."
320
The 1925 Soviet copyright law remained unchanged until
1961 when Article 98 of the Fundamental Principles was
amended to add personal non-property rights of the author.
However, the personal rights of the author were not the exclu-
sive rights of the author, since property ownership, according to
the Soviet government, did not fit into a socialist system.321 In
theory, the Soviet copyright system provided protection for the
author's rights of authorship and rights of integrity. But in prac-
tice the author's right of authorship could only be defended
where the offender failed to mention the author's real name or
pseudonym.3 22 While theoretically the Soviet author could de-
mand that all mutilated copies of his work, such as a bad trans-
(1993).
313. Bella Karakis, Moral Rights: French, United States, and Soviet Compliance
With Article 6bis of the Berne Convention, 5 TouRo INT'L L REv., 105, at 131 (1994).
314. See id. at 132.
315. See id.
316. See id.
317. Fleishman, supra note 312, at 192 (citing Art. 96-106).
318. See id. (citing Art. 475-516).
319. See id. at n.9.
320. See id. at 192.




lation, be withdrawn from publication, in practice not one single
case of such a claim was reported in the Soviet system.32
The Soviet copyright laws were politically motivated and de-
signed to provide favorable conditions for the creation of art,
literature, and science of high, ideological quality that promoted
the socialist philosophy.32 Thus, in 1918, a government decree
declared that all scientific, literary, musical, and artistic works
were the property of the government. 32
In accordance with the view of copyright as a union of the
interests of both the author and society, the Soviet government
reserved powers to utilize the author's work when necessary to
further the interests of society as a whole.32 6 The government
had free use of the author's work without his consent and with-
out payment of royalties to the author.32 7
When the Soviets joined the Universal Copyright Conven-
tion in 1973, sixty years of isolationism in the Soviet Union
were ended. USSR's accession to the Universal Copyright Con-
vention in 1973 reduced the free use by the government of the
author's work. The Soviet Union also engaged in the practice of
issuing compulsory licenses to provide the author with royalties
for the government's free use of his work.38s In 1973, the Soviet
legislature abolished the free use of translation in order to allow
the Soviet Union to join the Universal Copyright Convention.329
USSR's accession to the Universal Copyright Convention al-
lowed the payment of royalties for reproduction of foreign au-
thor's works.330 However, its accession to the Universal Copy-
right Convention did not prevent continued piracy activity in
the Soviet Union.A31
The Soviet economy was based on government ownership of
the means of production which allowed the Soviet government to
carry out the planned development of the Union. Publishing
houses, movie theaters, radio, television, theaters, and film stu-
dios were the property of the Soviet government and were under
323. See id
324. Fleishman, supra note 312, at 192.
325. See id at 193.
326. See id. at 195.
327. See id. at 196.
328. See id.
329. See id.
330. Brad Swenson, Intellectual Property Protection Through the Berne Convention:
A Matter of Economic Survival for the Post-Soviet New Commonwealth of Independent
States, 21 DE". J. INT'L L & POLY 77, 89 (1992).
331. See id.
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the management of the "Socialist User Organizations."3 3 2 The
Socialist User Organization was the official censorship organ of
the government. An author realized his personal rights of publi-
cation, reproduction, and distribution only upon signing a con-
tract with a socialist user organization which linked its approval
of an author's work directly to the work's ideological content or
social value.3 The Soviet author who wished to disseminate po-
tentially offensive literature circumvented the Socialist User Or-
ganization through the process of samizdat, which was the un-
derground pressYm While samizdat was not expressly forbidden,
Articles 70 and 190-1 of the USSR Criminal Code permitted offi-
cial interference by criminal prosecutions in almost all cases of
samizdat.33 5
The artistically crippling effect of Soviet censorship and the
harsh persecution of artists and writers remain legendary. Artis-
tic freedom and the elimination of fear during the transition pe-
riod following Perestroika and Glasnost, which effectuated the
transformation of the Soviet centrally-planned economy to a
more democratic/market economy, are primary reasons why the
Russians are willing to endure severe economic hardships
wrought by this radical transition.33 6
Remedies for copyright infringement were hard to obtain in
the Soviet courts, and some people took redress under adminis-
trative law. 37 The unworkable and antiquated regime of Soviet
copyright laws invited piracy and discouraged creativity.
Despite the obvious inadequacy of Soviet copyright legisla-
tion, its strength was in it expansive "personal" or "moral"
rights provisions. Authors possess two kinds of rights: personal
and property. Personal rights, known as moral rights, arise
when the work is created, and property rights arise when the
work is socially utilized.33 8 Personal rights consist of the right to
be acknowledged as the author of the work (right of pater-
nity),339 the right to have the work protected against improper




336. The recent failure of a strike by unpaid Russian workers in March 1997 is a
clear indication that the majority of the people are in favor of the transition to a market
economy and are willing to endure economic hardship. It is primarily the minority older
generation and the retirees who lost the most from this transition, leaving them
disgruntled.
337. Fleishman, supra note 312, at 202.
338. See id. at 194.
339. Karakis, supra note 313, at 109.
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changes or adaptations by others (right of integrity),M4 and the
right to have the work published or performed.341 Comparing
American and Soviet intellectual property legislation, it is inter-
esting to note that American intellectual property legislation is
weak with respect to personal rights and strong with respect to
property rights. The Soviet moral rights protection was adopted
early in the Soviet laws and expanded .in the new 1961 All-
Union Copyright Provision. The All-Union Copyright Provision
was adopted in order to make the Soviet Union compliant with
the 6bis provision of the Berne Convention. -
Although some aspects of Soviet law were compatible with
the Berne Convention, others were not, and this incompatibility
created a barrier to the USSR's and post-Soviet's accession to
the Berne Convention.m The Berne Convention extends the du-
ration of protection for fifty years after the author's death,
whereas the Soviet Union in its Fundamental Principles (1961)
provided protection only for twenty-five years.3" The Soviet gov-
ernment's practice of free use and compulsory licensing were vi-
olative of the Berne Convention. The conflicts of law between
federal and individual republics' copyright laws were contrary to
the requirement in the Berne Convention of a unified Federal
Copyright Act.m The Soviet laws imposing formalities such as
the appearance of the author's name, year of creation and place
of publication on each print of a work were in direct conflict
with the Berne Convention.3 7 Moreover, the practice by the So-
cialist User Organizations of demanding changes in an author's
work and of preventing performance and dissemination of the
work for noncompliance violated the Berne Convention's rights
to authorship, public performance, and other guaranteed mini-
mum rights.m
The Soviet accession in 1973 to the Universal Copyright
Convention (UCC), which was designed to lead to a single sys-
tem of international copyright protection for the entire world,349
did not significantly upgrade its copyright protection to make it
340. See id.
341. Fleishman, supra note 312, at 194.
342. Karakis, supra note 313, at 134.
343. Fleishman, supra note 312, at 207.
344. See id at 206-207.
345. See id. at 207.
346. See id
347. See id.
348. See id at 208.
349. See id.
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compliant with the Berne Convention.30 The UCC accords copy-
right protection to the author for only twenty-five years after
the author's death. To comply with the UCC, the Soviet legisla-
ture extended its grant of protection from fifteen to twenty-five
years after the death of the author.31
The Soviet legislature significantly altered its copyright
laws in order to join the Universal Copyright Convention, in-
cluding the creation of the VAAP (the All-Union State Agency
for Copyright and Related Rights). The VAAP represented the
unions of writers, artists, composers, and journalists, and the
Ministry of Trade. The real purpose and effect of the VAAP was
to prevent publication of works by Soviet dissidents.3
2
The effects of Soviet copyright law on foreign authors were
grievous. To determine the scope of a foreign author's copyright,
the deciding factor was where the work was first produced in
tangible form.3 3 The foreign author had a recognized copyright
under applicable Soviet law if the work was published originally
within the territories of the USSR.154 The foreign author had a
recognized copyright in the USSR for a work published for the
first time abroad in accordance with international agreements to
which the Soviet Union was a party.35 Thus, in the absence of
an international or bilateral agreement to which both the Soviet
Union and the author's country of citizenship belonged, the
work of the foreign author had no copyright protection at all,
and neither the foreign author nor his heirs had the right to de-
mand payment for the dissemination of the author's work in the
territory of the Soviet Union if the work was originally pub-
lished in the territory of a foreign country.3 56 Foreign authors
were forced to sign a contract with the VAAP which could then
block importation of any materials which it deemed to have an
anti-Soviet tone. 7
The United States demanded that the Soviets correct the in-
adequate protection their copyright system afforded to the works
of United States nationals. In response to American pressure
and in an attempt harmonize its intellectual property legislation




353. See id- at 210.
354. See id.
355. See id.
356. See &d. at 21L
357. Fleishman, supra note 312, at 211.
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tent to adhere to the Berne Convention in 1990.358 Russia actu-
ally did join in 1995.
The Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, and on December 8,
1991 the Commonwealth of Independent States was formed.
While international treaty obligations would continue to be
honored, all Soviet domestic law was threatened with extinc-
tion.359 A large proportion of Soviet-era legislation still remains
in effect today, but a new legal system is being formed. The for-
mation of a new intellectual property infrastructure is clearly an
important objective of the Russian Federation, 360 but it is
equally important to encourage the independent republics to ad-
here to international conventions and to adapt their domestic
laws to conform to international standards.36'
As part of this renovation of the intellectual property infra-
structure, on February 24, 1992 President Yeltsin formed a Rus-
sian Agency for Intellectual Property under the President of the
Russian Federation (RAIS), which replaced the infamous VAAP.
The purpose of RAIS was to reform the orientation and struc-
ture of socialist copyright law. RAIS was thereafter replaced by
RAO (The Russian Authors' Society).
Since 1992, after the ratification of a 1990 Trade Agreement
between the United States and the Russian Federation, five new
intellectual property laws were enacted in Russia in order to
comply with international standards of intellectual property pro-
tection. A new Criminal code was enacted which provides for
criminal action in the event of piracy of intellectual property.
B. New Trademark Law
On September 23, 1992, the Russian Parliament passed the
law On Trademarks, Registered Servicemarks, and Designations
of Place of Origin of Products3 62 (1992 Trademark Law). It was
enacted on October 14, 1992 with the new laws on patents, inte-
grated circuits, computer programs and data bases, as part of a
358. Karakis, supra note 313, at 133. See also Michiel Elst, The Interaction of Euro-
pean Community and Russian Copyright Law: A Matter of Partnership and Cooperation,
22 REv. C. & E. Eum L 267, 283-84 (1996).
359. Brad Swensen, Intellectual Property Protection Through the Berne Convention:
A Matter of Economic Survival For the Post-Soviet New Commonwealth of Independent
States, 21 DFNv, J. IN'. L. & POL'Y. 77, n.140 (1992).
360. Fleishman, supra note 312, at 234.
361. See id. at 233.
362. Peter B. Maggs, New Russian Intellectual Property Legislation, SE.EL., Nov.
1992, at 12 (citing the Law on Trademarks, Service Marks and Designations of Place of
Origin of Goods, of Sept. 23, 1992, Ross. Gazeta, 17 Oct., 1992).
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comprehensive new system of intellectual property laws in the
Russian Federation ("Russia7).363
Like the former Trademark Law of July 3, 1991, the 1992
Trademark Law comports with the 1990 US-USSR Trade Agree-
ment, and thus provides for Russia to implement a trademark
law complying with Article 10 bis and Article 10 of the Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property.36
The 1992 Trademark Law addresses issues of legal protec-
tion of trademarks, servicemarks, designations of origin, and
collective marks; registration of marks and designations; use of
marks and designations; and the transfer and termination of le-
gal protection for marks. 65 The 1992 Trademark Law grants
protection for marks on the basis of their registration in accor-
dance with the 1992 Trademark Law or by virtue of interna-
tional agreements to which Russia is a party. Therefore, it is im-
portant to determine if the proposed mark is protected under an
international agreement in the absence of a registration, and if
the mark is registrable in Russia. It remains to be seen how
much protection the 1992 Trademark Law will provide a mark
that is registered in Russia or that is protectable pursuant to an
international agreement. Russia is a party to the major interna-
tional trademark conventions including the Paris Convention for
the Protection of Intellectual Property. Not all marks are regis-
trable under the 1992 Trademark Law. For example, this law
will not allow registration of marks consisting only of designa-
tions which are generally accepted symbols and terms, or which
denote the appearance, quality, quantity, characteristics, pur-
pose and value of the goods, etc.366 The criteria for the registra-
bility of a mark are basically consistent with the trademark leg-
islation of other commercially important countries.
367
Marks must be submitted to the State Patent Agency of the
Russian Federation. The 1992 Trademark Law grants priority to
foreign applicants who are members of the Paris Convention for
the Protection of Industrial Property (including the United
States) and who filed an application for the marks in their home
country within six months immediately preceding the date of
the application submitted to the State Patent Agency.3
68
363. Preston M. Torbert & Maciej 'Matt" Orden, New Trademark Law, EAsT/WEST
EXECUTIVE GuIDE, Mar. 1993, at 23.
364. See id.
365. See id.





The 1992 Trademark Law represents a significant effort by
the Russian authorities to improve intellectual property rights
in Russia. The law itself is sufficient, but it remains to be seen
whether the Russian authorities will have the resources and de-
termination to enforce the law effectively369
C. New Patent Law
Just before the demise of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Par-
liament on May 31, 1991 adopted a new set of Laws on Inven-
tive Activity for the protection of patents. 370 These new laws,
based on a Western style system of reward for novel, non-
obvious inventions with industrial applicability, were a mixture
of the best patent systems of America, France and West Ger-
many, but were still infused with the goals and ideals of the So-
viet Union.3 71 The new independent republics adopted these
laws in 1992, but they were no doubt only temporary measures.
New substantive laws on the protection of patents were
adopted in the fall of 1992.372 The Russian Parliament passed a
new Patent Law of September 23, 1992 which was enacted on
October 14, 1992. 373
Russia's patent agency, Rospatent, has replaced the USSR's
Gospatent, and will carry on the administration and policy mak-
ing with respect to patents within the Russian Federation.3 7 4
The Russian republic recognizes all patents issued under the
USSR laws, and the republic will recognize the priority of pat-
ents filed under the USSR system and the new system.375
The Russian republic's new patent laws are similar to those
of the European Patent Convention 76 with two exceptions: com-
puter programs and algorithms are exempted from protection.
The new patent laws provide protection for a new use of a
known arrangement, process substance or species of micro-
369. See id. at 25.
370. Laura A. Pitta, Comment, Intellectual Property Laws in the Former Soviet Re-
publics: A Time of Transition, 8 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 499, 500
(1992).
371. See id.
372. Michael Newcity, Law on Copyright and Neighboring Rights, S.E.E.L., Oct.
1993, at 1.
373. Maggs, supra note 362, at 12 (citing the Patent Law of Sept. 23, 1992, Ross.
Gazeta, 14 Oct., 1992).
374. Pitta, supra note 370, at 503.
375. See id.
376. See id at n.17 (citing the Convention on the Grant of European Patents, Oct.
5, 1973, 13 LLM. 270).
[Vol. 46
PIRACY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
organism. 377
Attempts are being made to establish an interstate patent
protection system within the CIS and an interstate patent of-
fice.378 The trend, however, is for each of the republics to estab-
lish its own intellectual property offices and laws.379 The United
States negotiating team from the United States Patent and
Trademark Office is encouraging the former Soviet republics to
establish a uniform interstate system which could more effi-
ciently make use of their limited resources380 and insure stand-
ardization of patent protection.
To implement the New Patent and Trademark Laws of
1992, the government of the Russian republic approved a Stat-
ute on Patent and Trademark Attorneys, authorizing them to
register without having to take a new examination, if they had
properly been registered under the USSR law. 1
D. New Copyright Laws
1. Computer Program and Database Protection Law. On
May 14, 1992 the Russian Parliament passed a new law "On the
Legal Protection of Computer Programs and Databases" (the
Computer Program and Database Protection Law)8 2 prohibiting
the copying of software and providing for a mechanism to award
damages.38 3 The Computer Program and Database Protection
Law protects computer programs and databases on the basis of
copyright. Computer programs are granted copyright protection
as "works of literature," and databases are granted copyright
protection as "collections." 38 4 Copyright protection covers com-
puter programs and databases from the moment of their crea-
tion throughout the life of the author and for a period of fifty
years after the author's death. Like the Patent Law, the Com-
puter Program Protection Law provides that computer programs
and databases developed by an employee in connection with the
performance of official duties or employment tasks are the prop-




381. John N. Hazard, Statute on Patent Attorneys, SEEL., Apr. 1993, at 12 (citing
12 Feb., 1993, Sob. Actov Presidenta, No. 7, item 573).
382. Catherine Mannick, New Laws on Integrated Circuit, Computer Program and
Database Protection, EAST/WEsT ExEcUTIvE GunE, Mar. 1993, at 19.
383. Fleishman, supra note 312, at 235.




erty of the employer, unless otherwise agreed to in a contract.38
Copyright protection extends to computer programs and
databases issued or situated on the territory of the Russian Fed-
eration regardless of the citizenship of the authors, their heirs
or other legal successors and assignees. 3 17 This new computer
program law was drafted to conform to the European Commis-
sion Directive on Legal Protection of Computer Programs,
adopted by the European Community in 1991.38
2. Integrated Circuit Protection Law. The new Russian law
enacted on October 20, 1992, "On the Legal Protection of Topolo-
gies of Integrated Circuits" (the IC Protection Law), provides
that intellectual property rights in topologies of integrated cir-
cuits are the inalienable personal rights of the authors of those
topologies and are protected by law in perpetuity.389 Authors of
topologies of integrated circuits may, but are not required to,
register their topologies with the Russian Agency for Legal Pro-
tection of Computer Programs. 390 Like the new Russian Patent
Law, the IC Protection Law contains provisions regarding topol-
ogies of integrated circuits developed at the workplace, but un-
like the Russian Patent Law, the Russian IC Protection law pro-
vides that rights to topologies of integrated circuits that are
created by an employee in the course of performing the em-
ployee's obligations at the workplace or fulfilling tasks set by his
or her employer, belong to such employee unless otherwise
agreed to in a contract between the employee and the em-
ployer.3 91 On the basis of international treaties to which the
Russian Federation is a party or on the basis of reciprocity, for-
eign individuals and entities are granted the same rights as
Russian citizens under the IC Protection Law.392
3. Law on Copyright and Neighboring Rights. After enact-
ing the Computer Program and Database Protection Law, the
Russian Supreme Soviet attempted broader copyright reform
and passed a comprehensive Law on Copyright and Neighboring
Rights on July 9, 1993. This law incorporates the Computer Pro-
gram and Database Protection Law and gives greater protection
386. See i&. at 22.
387. See d. at 23.
388. Fleishman, supra note 312, at 235.
389. Mannick, supra note 382, at 20.
390. See id.
391. See d. at 20.
392. See id. at 21.
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to computer programs and databases.3 93 This new copyright law
raised the level of protection offered to copyrights in Russia, and
finally positioned Russia to join the Berne Convention by in-
creasing protection for all internationally recognized forms of
copyrightable works, by protecting software copyrights with
more certainty, and by expanding the moral rights of the au-
thor.3 94 Russia's accession to the Berne Convention in December
1994 became effective in March 1995.
One of the reforms introduced by the Law on Copyright and
Neighboring Rights allows copyright holders to establish inde-
pendent nonprofit organizations for the purpose of managing
and protecting their economic property rights. 95 In order to ef-
fectuate this provision, President Yeltsin recognized the succes-
sor to RAIS, the Russian Authors' Society (RAO), which collects
and distributes royalties to copyright owners and is managed by
the authors themselves.396
The history of the Law on Copyright and Neighboring
Rights is not without interest to human rights activists and
those interested in anti-piracy efforts by the former Soviet
Union. The new copyright law of July 9, 1993 is a revision of a
law adopted by the Supreme Soviet in April 1993 which pro-
vided in Article 50 (3) that the police had the authority to freely
enter the premises of any individual or entity at any time of day
or night and search the premises and confiscate any copies,
materials, equipment, objects or documents of suspected copy-
right pirates.397 President Yeltsin returned this law to the Su-
preme Soviet for reconsideration because he felt its implementa-
tion might lead to violations of human rights.398 Thereafter,
Article 50(3) was deleted from the law, and several other minor
changes were introduced.
The Law on Copyright and Neighboring Rights supersedes
the copyright provision of the USSR Fundamentals of Civil Leg-
islation, and this law, together with the Integrated Circuit Pro-
tection Law and the Computer Protection Law, both adopted in
393. Monica B. Vermeer, A New Era in Russian Copyright Law: Protecting Com-
puter Software in the Post-Soviet Russian Federation, 5 TRANSNATL L & CONTEMP. PROBS.
147, 164-65 (1995).
394. See id. at 165.
395. See id. at 167. "President Yeltsin dissolved the state-run RAIS and legally rec-
ognized the Russian Authors' Society (RAO) as the successor to RAIS regarding prop-
erty, financial resources, and contracts concluded under the former organization." Id.
396. See id.
397. Newcity, supra note 372, at 1. See also Igor Pozhitkov, Copyright and Neigh-
boring Rights Protection in the Russian Federation, 20 REv. C. & E. Eu& L 53 (1994).
398. See Newcity, supra note 372, at 1.
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October 1992, and any legislation that may in the future be
adopted by the republics within the Russian Federation, consti-
tute Russia's legislation on copyright.
Under the Law on Copyright and Neighboring Rights, copy-
right commences upon the creation of a work, not after registra-
tion.3- The copyright proprietor may choose to mark each copy
of the work with the standard copyright notice: the © symbol,
the name of the copyright proprietor, and the year of first publi-
cation.4°0 Copyright protection lasts for the length of the author's
life plus fifty years after his or her death.401 Copyright extends
to published and unpublished works that exist in some objective
form within Russia, regardless of the citizenship of the authors
or of their legal successors (heirs and assignees).40 2 Foreign au-
thors and publishers can protect their works in Russia even if
they are not subject to protection under a treaty, if they arrange
for the simultaneous publication of those works abroad and in
Russia.4o3
Though in general the author has the exclusive right to the
use of a work, nine articles of the Law on Copyright and Neigh-
boring Rights are devoted to defining the circumstances under
which a work can be used without the author's permission or
without payment of royalties.4 For example, Article 18 provides
that a previously published work may be reproduced for per-
sonal purposes without the permission of the author or the pay-
ment of royalties. 4 5 As long as the author's name, the title of
the work, and the source from which it is taken are cited, a
work may be extensively used.4°6
Part IH of the Law on Copyright and Neighboring Rights
contains nine articles that define rights granted with respect to
the use of sound recordings. Legal protection granted to record-
ings and broadcast programs has a duration of fifty years from
the date of first performance or production of the work.4 7 Sound
recordings may be used in some way without the permission of
the recording artists or the producer, but the law provides a
compulsory license (that is, free use but mandatory payment of
399. See id at 2.
400. See id. (citing the Law on Copyright and Neighboring Rights, Art. 9(10)).
401. See id. at 7 (citing the Law on Copyright and Neighboring Rights, Art. 27(1)).
402. See id (citing the Law on Copyright and Neighboring Rights, Art. 5(1)).
403. See iUi (citing the Law on Copyright and Neighboring Rights at Art. 5(2)).
404. See id at S.
405. See id
406. See id at 9 (citing the Law on Copyright and Neighboring Rights at Art. 19).
407. See id. at 9 (citing the Law on Copyright and Neighboring Rights at Art.
43(1)).
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royalties to author) for the public performance, broadcast or
transmission by cable of a recording.4
8
The Law on Copyright and Neighboring Rights expands the
court's power to impose penalties for infringement. For example,
it adopts all the remedies listed in Article 18 of the Computer
Program and Database Protection Law.409 Thus, illegal copies of
copyrighted works may be seized.410 Publication under one's own
name of another's copyrighted work or unlawful reproduction or
distribution of such products is punishable by criminal sanc-
tions, but the Computer Program and Database Protection Law
does not specify what these criminal sanctions are.
411
Remedies under the Law on Copyright and Neighboring
Rights include criminal sanctions as well as civil penalties. The
new Russian Federal Criminal Code has a provision for penal-
ties against copyright violations. Civil remedies include the right
to demand recognition of one's ownership rights; the right to
restoration of the situation that existed before the infringement
of such rights; the right to cessation of activities infringing such
rights or threatening infringement of those rights; the right to
compensation for losses incurred, which could include income
unlawfully received by the infringer; and payment by the in-
finger of a penalty established through judicial or arbitral pro-
ceedings in the amount of 5,000 to 50,000 times the amount of
minimal monthly compensation for use of the copyrighted item
as established by law.412 Illegal copies of copyrightable material
may be confiscated according to a judicial or arbitral ruling.
413
Violations of the Law on Copyright and Neighboring Rights are
also punishable by a judicially or arbitrarily imposed fine in the
amount of ten percent of the sum awarded by the judge or arbi-
trator in favor of the plaintiff, and such a fine would be in addi-
tion to the remedies described above.414 This fine is paid into the
Republican budget of the Russian Federation.
41 5
4. Good Copyright Laws Badly Enforced. The new Law on
Copyright and Neighboring Rights contains the protections nec-
essary to prevent piracy and provides adequate criminal and
408. See id (citing the Law on Copyright and Neighboring Rights at Art. 39(1)).
409. Vermeer, supra note 393, at 165.








civil remedies to deter intellectual property piracy. Nevertheless,
piracy is rampant in Russia. This may be due to the failure of
procurators to bring criminal complaints, the failure by the Rus-
sian courts to impose criminal sanctions, the reluctance by par-
ties to pursue civil remedies, and the general lack of familiarity
with civil remedies. Civil actions in Russian courts are increas-
ing slowly. Even if Russians were to become more respectful of
the judicial system, there is a general absence of effective mech-anisms in Russia for the enforcement of civil judgments. Moreo-
ver, civil plaintiffs may be fearful of reprisals by local officials
engaging in piracy or by Mafiosi.
Despite the general failure of the new Law on Copyright
and Neighboring Rights to prevent piracy, there are both domes-
tic and international beneficial effects of the new law. The do-
mestic effects of this law include increased certainty of owner-
ship rights in computer programs and databases; increased
autonomy of authors who can contract freely with publishers in
the West; increased creativity among members of the scientific
community; and reduction of the Russian brain-drain phenome-
non which is depleting Russia of its most significant talent.416
The international effects of this law are numerous. Since its in-
creased protection positioned Russia for accession to the Berne
Convention, Russia, now a Berne convention member nation, is
able to enter the international trade arena with more than one
hundred other member nations.417
E. United States-Russia Trade Agreement Affecting Copyright
In response to the United States Copyright Office's numer-
ous concerns about Soviet copyright law protection, a trade
agreement was signed by President Mikhail Gorbachev and
President Bush in June 1990 (1990 Trade Agreement).418 The
United States Copyright Office identified Russia's "failure to
protect computer programs and databases adequately under cop-
yright law; the failure to protect sound recordings adequately;
incomplete public performance rights; overly broad fair use and
personal use exemptions; and inadequate enforcement mecha-
nisms generally."419 The 1990 Trade Agreement granted Most
416. Vermeer, supra note 393, at 168.
417. See id. at 169.
418. Fleishman, supra note 312, at 214.
419. See id at n.156 (citing the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Intellectual Prop-
erty and Judicial Administration, May 17, 1991 (statement of Ralph Oman, Register of
Copyrights and Associate Librarian of Congress), reprinted in [Developments 1987-1991
Transfer Binder] COPYRIGHT L, REP. (CCH) Section 20,638).
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Favored Nation status to the Soviet Union 2 and obligated it to
sign the Berne Convention.
However, in accordance with the Jackson-Vanik Amendment
of 1974,421 which focuses on the emigration policies of exporting
countries, President Bush refused to send the 1990 Trade Agree-
ment to be ratified by Congress until Moscow agreed to enact
less restrictive emigration laws, which it did in May 1991.4
President Bush further held up Congressional action until So-
viet officials agreed to enact stricter intellectual property legis-
lation, due to pressure exerted by the Motion Picture Associa-
tion of America (MPAA) which objected to Russia's long history
of pirating US films.43 Under the direction of Jack Valenti,4
the MPAA instituted a film embargo against the Soviet Union in
June 1991 in response to its violations of a 1988 Film Agree-
ment. The MPAA lobbied effectively to delay ratification of the
1990 Trade Agreement because the MPAA reported losses to for-
eign pirates of $1.2 billion a year.'2
In response to the 1990 Trade Agreement and delays in its
ratification by the United States in January 1992, the Supreme
Soviet acted swiftly, after the December 1, 1991 revolution that
caused the demise of communism, to enact changes to the Fun-
damental Principles of Civil Legislation which are now super-
seded by the 1993 Copyright Law. These changes in the Funda-
mental Principles of Civil Legislation would allow the former
Soviet Union to join the Berne Convention. Thus, Article 135,
section 2 of the Fundamental Principles of Civil Legislation pro-
vided that the author had a right to authorship, the right to a
name, and the right to the integrity of the work. 26 Moreover,
Article 135, section 6 provided that the author's heirs could in-
herit the right to protect the integrity of the work. 27 Finally,
the author's rights of integrity and of authorship were protected
"indefinitely" under Article 137, section 3.428 These provisions
420. See id. at 189 n.2 (citing the United States-Soviet Union Agreement on Trade
Relations, reprinted in [Developments 1987-1991 Transfer Binder] COPYRIGHT L REP.
(CCH) Section 20,650).
421. Jackson-Vanik Amendment of 1974 § 402(a), 19 U.S.C. § 2432 (1994).
422. Fleishman, supra note 312, at 215.
423. See id. at 218.
424. See id. at 214.
425. See id. at 218.
426. Karakis, supra note 313, at n.176 (citing the Fundamentals of Civil Legislation
of the U.S.S.R., Ch. IV. Fundamentals of Copyright Law of 1961, as amended May 31,
1991, Art. 135(2)).




brought the Soviet moral rights protection within the minimum
requirements that may be observed by all Berne member
countries.
As a result of the ratification of the 1990 Trade Agreement
in 1992, five new intellectual property laws have been enacted
in Russia since October 1992 which have brought Russian intel-
lectual property protection into line with international stan-
dards.42 These five laws are the Patent Law of the Russian Fed-
eration, enacted October 14, 1992;410 the Law of the Russian
Federation on Trademarks, Service Marks, and Designations of
Place of Origin of Goods, enacted October 17, 1992;41 Law of the
Russian Federation on the Legal Protection of Computer Pro-
grams and Data Bases, enacted October 20, 1992;42 Law of the
Russian Federation on the Legal Protection of the Topology of
Integrated Micro-Circuits, enacted October 20, 1992;m and the
most recent Law on Copyright and Neighboring Rights, enacted
July 9, 1993.A4 The trademark law, the software/database law,
and the micro-circuit topology law are highly satisfactory, but
the patent law leaves certain matters of patent administration
and employer-employee rights to be decided by future
legislation.43
F. Piracy of Intellectual Property in Russia
Piracy and the illegal copying of software have become a
widespread, socially acceptable practice in Russia.436 The Inter-
national Intellectual Property Association reported that Russia's
estimated piracy levels for home videos, business software, and
entertainment software all exceed ninety percent, and only one-
tenth of the products sold in the Russian market are legiti-
429. Maggs, supra note 362, at 1.
430. See id. at 12 (citing the Russian Patent Law of Sept. 23, 1992, Ross. Gazeta, 14
Oct., 1992). See also supra text accompanying notes 370-381 (discussing Russian patent
laws).
431. See id. (citing the Law on Trademarks, Service Marks and Designations of
Place of Origin of Goods, of Sept. 23, 1992, Ross. Gazeta, 17 Oct., 1992). See also supra
text accompanying notes 362-369 discussing Russian trademark laws.
432. See id. (citing the Law on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs and
Data Bases, of Sept. 23, 1992, Ross. Gazeta, 20 Oct., 1992). See also supra text accompa-
nying notes 382-417 discussing Russian copyright laws.
433. See id (citing the Law on the Legal Protection of the Topology of Integrated
Micro-Circuits, of Sept. 23, 1992, Ross. Gazeta, 21 Oct., 1992).
434. Vermeer, supra note 393, at n.108 (citing the Law on Copyright and Neighbor-
ing Rights, RF Supreme Soviet Decree No. 5351/1-1).
435. Maggs, supra note 362, at 1.
436. Vermeer, supra note 393, at 169.
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mate.4 7 The ease with which software can be pirated without
detection, and Russia's long history of acceptance of piracy cou-
pled with the people's inculcated fear of the ownership of prop-
erty, make the elimination of piracy a challenging task. Piracy
has reached epidemic proportions in Russia, and pirated copies
still comprise over ninety percent of the software market in
Russia.4
8
Even though the new laws provide stiffer penalties for in-
fringement of intellectual property laws, eradication of piracy
will require more than a legislative mandate.4 9 Some companies
have resorted to selling their products at lower prices to en-
courage users to purchase legitimate copies of the programs and
to allow dealers to expand.44 Other companies combat piracy by
selling the programs in rubles and marketing a new local lan-
guage version on a regular basis.441
As in China where government officials and state-run agen-
cies are reportedly engaged in pirating, the main culprits in
Russia are not individuals or black market dealers but rather
government enterprises and state-run agencies. 442 This explains
why many members of the legislative and executive branches
opposed the new copyright legislation because of its anti-piracy
mechanisms. 44
G. Russian Anti-Piracy Laws
To counter the practice of government piracy of intellectual
property, President Yeltsin ordered the Presidential Council and
State Duma to use only licensed programs. Corporations are
also attempting to comply with anti-piracy laws. GAZPROM, a
major Russian oil company, recently purchased over $500,000
worth of software. 44
The anti-piracy effects of the new laws are mixed. According
to Microsoft, legitimate sales have increased by one thousand
percent between July 1993 and June 1994, and the software
market is growing at a rapid pace."5 Microsoft's managing direc-
tor in Moscow called Russia the "superpower of piracy," but he
437. $14 Billion, supra note 242, at 94.
438. Vermeer, supra note 393, at 169-70.
439. See id. at 169.
440. See id. at 171.
441. See id.
442. See id. at 170.
443. See a
444. See id. at 170-171.
445. See id at 171.
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is confident that the piracy situation is getting much better.440
But Microsoft's success story may be the exception rather
than the rule. Widespread piracy which prompted the new legis-
lation has not significantly abated.
H. United States' Attempts to Combat Piracy in Russia
The International Intellectual Property Association (IIPA)
recommended placing Russia on the 1995 Priority Watch List of
countries with inadequate copyright protection, This status,
which ironically elevated Russia from its pre-reform position on
the Watch List, indicates that copyright violations in Russia are
worse, despite the passage of the new laws.447
USTR Charlene Barshefsky announced on December 20,
1996 that Russia would remain on the USTR's "Watch List" of
countries being monitored for failing to give adequate protection
to American intellectual property.448 However, in 1997 the ad-
ministration actually decided to place Russia on the "Priority
Watch List" because of serious problems including insufficient
progress in improving copyright protection and enforcement.
The USTR recognizes that Russia continues to address Ameri-
can intellectual property concerns and to fulfill its obligations
under the 1992 U.S.-Russia Bilateral Trade Agreement. Barshef-
sky reported that a New Criminal Code would take effect in
Russia in January 1997 which will increase criminal penalties
for intellectual property violations. She claims that Russia de-
nies copyright protection to pre-1995 foreign sound recordings
and other copyrighted foreign works produced prior to 1973, and
Russia has not addressed discriminatory market access barriers
to American works. For these reasons Russia will remain on the
priority watch list in 1997.
Despite criminal sanctions, which are mentioned but not
specified in the new Russian intellectual property laws, the IIPA
based its recommendation to keep Russia on the priority watch
list on the fact that Russia had not yet criminalized intellectual
property rights infringement, and Russian enforcement efforts
have been weak. For that reason, the IPA requested the USTR
to withdraw Russia's preferential trade status with the United
States until copyright enforcement improves.449 On June 13,
446. See id.
447. See id. at 172.
448. 448 USTR Says Russia, Saudi Arabia Will Remain on IP 'Watch List, 11
World Intell. Prop. Rep. (BNA) 37, at 52 (Feb. 1997).
449. Vermeer, supra note 393, at 172.
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1996, Russia's New Criminal Code was signed and subse-
quently took effect on January 1, 1997, providing stiffer penal-
ties for violations of intellectual property rights.450
I. United States Trade with Russia
Russia and the countries of the CIS are encountering diffi-
cult problems in the transition period following the breakup of
the Soviet Union, and these difficulties naturally affect trade
with the United States. For example, although the economic sit-
uation in the Ukraine is unfavorable, foreign investors are none-
theless attracted to certain sectors of the Ukrainian economy.451
In 1996, elections confirmed Russia's forward direction and nu-
merous Russian companies became interested in entering Amer-
ican capital markets.452 For example, increased activity in the is-*
suance of American Depository Receipts for the purchase of
stock in Russian companies is a positive sign of an increase in
trade.453 Foreign investment in Russia continues to grow despite
political uncertainty, the fluidity of its legal framework,M and
the many hidden deterrents to trade such as corruption, graft,
the non-convertibility of the ruble, the failure to bring Russian
accounting practices up to internationally accepted standards,
and the numerous approvals and bureaucratic snags which are
vestiges of the communist system decreasing substantially since
1991 but which have not yet totally disappeared.455
The countries of the post-Soviet world have the difficult
task of integrating their economies into the global market. Since
1991, when the Soviet Union formally dissolved, these new inde-
pendent countries uncoupled special trade links of their econo-
mies and eliminated subsidies to outmoded industrial outfits,
which triggered a debt crisis.456 These nations radically altered
450. See Development in Intellectual Property Rights, 11 World Intell. Prop. Rep.
(BNA) 181, at 216 (June 1997).
451. Alex Frishberg, Investment in Gas and Oil Industry: Ukrainian Legislation and
Practice, SEE.L, Dec. 1996, at 1.
452. John T. Connor, Jr., Russian ADRs in US. Capital Markets, S.E.E.L., July/Aug.
1996, at 10.
453. See id. at 11-13.
454. Van Z. Krikorian, Special Considerations in CIS Power Projects, SZ.EE, Dec.
1996, at 4-6.
455. See Tiefenbrun, supra note 27 (discussing the many factors affecting joint ven-
ture transactions between US. and Russian partners). See also Marina T Charles, The
Art of the Russian Deal (More Braque than Botticelli), SE.E.L, Nov. 1996, at 1.
456. Shirley Goldstein & Mary Holland, The Summer of 96: Law Reform in Russia,
SYE.E., July/Aug. 1996, at 1.
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their legal systems in order to establish a "culture of legality."5 7
Despite the odds, important strides have been made in Russia
in the past five years to develop a commercial legal system in
consonance with global economic practices.
The adequacy of intellectual property legislation and the ef-
fective enforcement of these laws have a serious effect on foreign
investments and trade with Russia. For example, if intellectual
property (claimed to be owned by a Russian partner) is classi-
fied as "secret," and rights to all the intellectual property are
protected only by an author's certificates, the intellectual prop-
erty may fall into the public domain once it is declassified.4
8
The high risk due to political volatility, the fluidity of the
legal climate, and the practice of intellectual property piracy
continue to place a damper on trade between the United States
and Russia. Nevertheless, steel imports from Russia have in-
creased markedly.45 9 In the course of an official Kremlin press
conference, Anatoly Kruglov said that Russia's foreign trade had
more than doubled. At the same time coffers are largely
empty.4 Trade turnover in 1996 was 39 billion rubles. In 1997,
within two months Russia had an increase of 6.7 billion rubles
or $1.7 billion dollars as compared to the corresponding period
the previous year. Russia does 4.9% of its trade with the United
States.461 Russia's exports increased 9.1% in January and Febru-
ary, although Russian trade with CIS countries has decreased.
According to President Clinton at the most recent summit
meeting in Helsinki, both Russia and the United States must
solve problems of reciprocal trade. Both must take steps to in-
crease access to each other's markets, and the United States
should grant Russia MFN trading status.462
According to reports, Russian exports to the United States
are $442 million or 2.5% of total Russian exports. This is a little
more than the rate of Russian exports to the United Kingdom.
American imports to Russia are $1857 million or 8.4% of total
American exports. This is just a little more than the rate of
American exports to Austria.463
457. See id.
458. Charles, supra note 455, at 1.
459. Thomas W. Gerdel, Reborn Steel Industry, BusiNEss, May 28, 1997, at 1.
460. Official Kremlin International News Broadast, (Apr. 11, 1997).
461. See id.
462. Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Apr. 23, 1997, at 3.
463. BARCLAYS BANK Cot mmy REPORT, May 1997, at 1.
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III. PossmLE SOLUTIONS TO PIRACY IN RuSsIA AND IN CHINA
In China, despite a recent Asian financial crisis, and Russia
intellectual property laws, old and new, abound, but piracy
prevails and remains an impediment to international trade with
the United States. The adequacy of the intellectual property
laws is not the problem. The failure to enforce the laws, the
general lack of respect for the judicial system, and the public
misunderstanding and intrinsic fear of the concept of ownership
of intellectual property are the underlying causes for the failure
to eradicate or effectively reduce piracy.
In China, the economy is booming and the new intellectual
property laws are plentiful and protective, reflecting Western
pressures set forth in the 1979, 1992 and 1995 trade agree-
ments which made Chinese accession to major international in-
tellectual property conventions possible. Since its adoption of a
comprehensive trademark law in 1982, China has become a
player in the international arena of technology transfers. China
joined the Paris Convention for Protection of Industrial Property
in 1985 and the Madrid Agreement for International Registra-
tion of Trademarks in 1989. In response to the 1979 Trade
Agreement, China adopted a cohesive patent law system in
1984, and joined international agreements and institutions such
as WIPO in 1980 and the Patent Cooperation Treaty in 1992.
The 1979 Trade Agreement spurred many domestic Chinese cop-
yright laws in the 1980s, but it was not until the 1990s, in re-
sponse to the 1992 MOU, that a National Bureau of Copyright
was established and a new more protective Copyright Law was
adopted. Two years later registration of computer software pro-
grams was legalized in China. China joined the Berne Conven-
tion in 1992, the Universal Copyright Convention in 1992, and
the Geneva Convention in 1993.
In Russia, old Soviet intellectual property laws reflected so-
cialist ideology and legitimized the government's free use of
copyrights. These laws supported the establishment of censor-
ship by the prevalent Socialist User Organization system (which
was countered by samizdat) and by the creation of the VAAP
which prevented publication of dissident works and was re-
placed first by RAIS and after 1990 by the RAO. These anti-
quated intellectual property laws were repealed after 1992, and
new intellectual property laws, drafted in response to the 1990
U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade Agreement, were adopted. The new patent
law, adopted in 1992, is a blend of American and European pat-
ent law. The new trademark law, adopted in 1992, the new com-
puter program and database law, adopted in 1992, and the new
1998]
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law on microcircuits also adopted in 1992 are protective. The
new copyright law adopted in July 1993 was so protective that it
finally positioned Russia to join the Berne Convention, which it
subsequently did in 1995.
One wonders why piracy persists in Russia and in China if
their intellectual property laws conform to international stan-
dards of protection.4" While criminal and civil penalties exist,
failure to enforce them does not provide the legal systems of
China and Russia with sufficient incentives to deter piracy. En-
forcement of these laws in both Russia and China is weak be-
cause judges, attorneys, police and the people at large are ill-
informed about the meaning of ownership of property. Owner-
ship was considered an evil according to communist ideology. To
obtain goods that were scarce, the person who successfully re-
sorted to stealing, bribery, corrupt tactics, and a complex system
of favors was considered clever, perhaps even heroic, because he
was beating the system. Moreover, government officials un-
evenly engage in piracy because reproducing someone else's CD
or copying someone's video is not perceived as an illegal act.
Therefore, raising public awareness of the illegality of piracy,
training the legal enforcement agents in the meaning of owner-
ship of intellectual property rights, and establishing an effective
enforcement mechanism must begin at once.
Lawyers and judges are basically in the dark when it comes
to the enforcement of intellectual property laws in China and
Russia. Legal precedents and case law do not exist for the prose-
cution of copyright infringement of computer software.45 Judges
may have difficulty determining the status of pre-existing works
or applying copyright law to technical computer programs and
databases. In fact, the International Intellectual Property Asso-
ciation has agreed to conduct enforcement seminars through the
Russian Ministry of Justice for officials who administer the new
copyright laws.4"
The Russian and Chinese people are generally skeptical
about the honesty and effectiveness of their respective judicial
systems. People in both these countries are accustomed to func-
tion according to a corrupt system of favors which may still be
prevalent in the court system. Fear of reprisals by government
officials and Mafiosi discourage people from obtaining redress of
their intellectual property grievances through the court system,
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and foreign partners are even more discouraged from using the
Chinese and Russian court systems to obtain their rights. Se-
vere penalties and public embarrassment of government officials
who engage in piracy should be instituted in order to address
the causes of poor implementation of intellectual property legis-
lation. Presently, neither the Russian nor the Chinese govern-
ment has any economic incentive to prosecute infringement
cases since the costs of enforcement outweigh the money col-
lected in fines. Thought must be given to reducing legal costs in
these countries.
In fact, the economic issue is at the crux of the solution. If
people can be made to understand and believe that there are ad-
verse effects on the economy stemming from the use of pirated
products, this realization may act as a deterrent. Russian and
Chinese firms engaging in piracy of software run the risk of us-
ing virus-infected or corrupted copies which may detrimentally
affect the economic return on their investment.
To combat piracy and effectively implement the intellectual
property laws in both China and Russia, the following measures
should be considered as possible policy plans: (1) the institution
of compliance monitoring of procedural and substantive obliga-
tions provided in the domestic and international intellectual
property laws; (2) the establishment of incentives to compliance
such as training programs, industrial programs, and technical
assistance programs; (3) the continuance of trade sanctions in
the event of non-compliance; (4) the accession of China and Rus-
sia to the WTO not as Less Developed Countries but on condi-
tion that immediate compliance of the TRIPS agreement be sat-
isfied for accession; and (5) the continuance of conditioned MFN
renewal until accession to the WTO occurs.
The continued threat to refuse Chinas entry into the WTO
may do more harm than good in stopping piracy. Chinas entry
into the WTO requires its strict adherence to TRIPS at least af-
ter five years following its entry, if China succeeds in classifying
itself as a less developed country. China's failure to comply with
TRIPS would result in the implementation of a promisingly ef-
fective and globally administered Dispute Resolution Mechanism
which is likely to deter piracy. The accession of China and Rus-
sia into the WTO should be reconsidered, feared less by the
United States, and desired more if we want to zealously pursue
the admirable goals of the WTO to promote free trade and eco-
nomic advantage globally.
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